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 ABSTRACT 
 
In the ‘passing the baton’ succession process, the incumbent CEO/Chairman 
relinquishes the CEO title, but retains the Chairman title to facilitate monitoring the new 
CEO during a probationary period.  The new CEO eventually wins the Chairman title if 
he is successful during the probationary period.  We argue that this type of succession 
process can lead to managerial conformism and conservatism because reputation 
concerns give the retiring CEO incentives to pressure the new CEO to continue existing 
policies and to avoid making major changes that could substantially improve 
performance or increase firm value.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no changes 
in operating performance, abnormal stock returns, or the number of policy decisions the 
new CEO makes during his probationary period, but significant increases in all of these 
measures after the probationary period ends.  Managerial entrenchment exacerbates 
succession-securing behavior during the probationary period, while effective monitoring 
and control mitigate it. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent corporate events have focused attention on a fundamental question in 
corporate governance research:  How effective are boards of directors in monitoring the 
activities of CEOs?  Determining the costs and benefits of separating the titles of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board is a central issue in answering this 
question.  The Securities Exchange Commission is trying to pass regulations to 
permanently separate these two titles, while all financial and management media 
including Wall Street Journal and Harvard Business Review publish articles on the pros 
and cons of separate titles.  Managerial succession methods, once part of the internal 
workings of companies have thus become the central topic of discussion in all platforms 
from classrooms to news rooms.  Proponents of dual leadership (i.e., having separate 
individuals hold the two titles) have argued that unitary leadership (i.e., having one 
individual hold both titles) amounts to the CEO “grading his own homework”.  Dual 
leadership is presumed better because the CEO has an independent monitor in the 
Chairman.   
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) argue that there are costs to dual leadership 
and that its benefits are overstated since most firms with dual leadership are simply 
transitioning to unitary leadership.  In this transition process, the incumbent 
CEO/chairman relinquishes the CEO title to an heir apparent, but retains the chairman 
title to help monitor the new CEO during a probationary period and pass along relevant 
information.  Good-performing CEOs eventually obtain combined CEO/chairman titles.  
With the former CEO as Chairman ready to step in if necessary, it is easier to terminate 
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new CEOs who perform poorly.  Vancil (1987) terms this succession process, common in 
U.S. firms, “passing the baton.”  
I argue that the common probationary succession process, known as passing-the-
baton, can create agency problems stemming from the retiring CEO’s incentives.  
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) argue that the prospect of serving on other firms’ 
boards of directors provides a promotion-like incentive for retiring CEOs, and find that 
the likelihood of obtaining such post-retirement positions depends on the retiring CEO’s 
past performance.  To increase the likelihood that outsiders view his past performance 
positively, a retiring CEO that remains as chairman during a new CEO’s probationary 
period has incentives to encourage his successor to continue his policies and projects.  
Continuing existing policies and projects makes it appear that those decisions were good 
even if they were bad ex ante or ex post based on the new CEO’s information.  The 
retiring CEO should also have incentives to discourage his successor from making major 
policy changes that could increase the operating performance and value of the firm 
substantially because this would signal to outsiders that the retiring CEO’s policies did 
not maximize firm value.  We call these incentives by the retiring CEO to make his 
successor conform “succession-securing behavior”.  Succession-securing behavior is 
costly for firms that need to change the retiring CEO’s policies to maximize shareholder 
wealth.   
The test-like nature of the succession process, with the retiring CEO as chairman 
of the board monitoring and evaluating the new CEO’s performance, simultaneously 
provides incentives for the new CEO to curry favor with the old CEO.  Since the new 
CEO understands the incentives the retiring CEO has, he has incentives to maintain the 
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retiring CEO’s policies and projects and to avoid substantial increases in operating 
performance or firm value as long as the retiring CEO is still chairman.   
Agency problems stemming from managerial conformism end when the new CEO 
obtains both titles and the retired CEO steps down from the chairmanship.  Thus, if 
managerial conformism negatively affects CEO decision-making activity and firm 
performance, I should observe non-positive changes in these areas while the new CEO is 
monitored by the retired CEO as Chairman, but improvements in these areas once the 
probationary period ends.  I also expect that managerial conformism to be higher if the 
departing CEO is entrenched, leading to longer probationary periods.  Conversely, 
external monitoring mechanisms like outside board members and institutional 
blockholders should reduce the severity of managerial conformism by ‘monitoring the 
monitor’, leading to shorter probationary periods with less conformism imposed.  
Additionally, share ownership by the retiring CEO should decrease succession-securing 
behavior because his interests are more aligned with those of shareholders. 
I test my hypotheses about managerial on a sample of 203 firms that announce 
probationary-type CEO succession processes between 1993 and 1995.  Consistent with 
the presence of managerial conformism, I find non-positive changes in the number of 
policy decisions the new CEO makes, operating performance, and abnormal stock returns 
during the probationary period.  In contrast, I find significant increases in these measures 
after the probationary period ends and the new CEO obtains the combined CEO and 
chairman title.  I find managerial conformism to be exacerbated by increased 
entrenchment of the departing CEO.  The longer the tenure of the departing CEO is in the 
firm, the higher the likelihood and costs of managerial conformism.  On the other hand, 
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efficient external controlling by institutional blockholders or outside board members 
reduces managerial conformism problems.  Larger and older firms, who are easier to 
monitor have less managerial conformism problems, while younger and smaller firms 
have more managerial conformism.  Larger firms with better external controls can even 
use probationary succession processes to their benefit. 
My results shed new light on the agency costs of a common succession process.  
Collectively, the extant literature produces ambiguous conclusions about the superiority 
of unitary versus dual leadership.  Since the passing-the-baton process involves 
temporary dual leadership, my evidence of managerial conformism suggests another cost 
of the dual leadership structure.   
My work is related to Naveen (2003), who documents that the tenure of the heir 
apparent and the time between the appointment of the heir apparent as COO or President 
and his subsequent appointment as CEO are longer in firms with passing-the-baton-type 
succession processes.  She also finds abnormal returns at the announcement of CEO 
turnover to be lower for firms with relay-type planned succession processes.  Naveen 
concludes that these results imply greater information transfer needs.  Her results are also 
consistent, however, with the type of managerial conformism I document in this 
dissertation.   
Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review, and chapter 3 develops the 
hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation.  The data and methodology are detailed in 
chapter 4.  Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the various CEO succession 
processes in the U.S.  The univariate test and regression results are provided in chapters 6 
and 7, respectively.  Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
According to the definition in textbooks, corporate boards provide a link between 
the providers of the capital (shareholders) and the people who use that capital to create 
value (managers).  Therefore, their main function is to monitor the actions of the 
management on behalf of the shareholders. However, in 93% of the largest U.S. 
companies, the chief executive officer is also the chairman of the board of directors 
(Monks and Minow, 2001).  This inherent conflict has attracted significant attention from 
both the financial media and the academic world.  A 1992 National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD) survey of corporate directors states that 20% of corporate 
directors believe that separating the CEO and chairman positions would have a positive 
effect on boardroom performance.  Similarly, 20% of the directors surveyed believe that 
such a separation will have a negative effect.  The remaining 60% think that the impact of 
separating the roles would be neutral (Monks and Minow, 2001). 
In this dissertation, I define dual leadership as having two separate individuals 
hold the CEO and chairman of the board titles, in other words, as the firm having dual 
leaders.  Unitary leadership on the other hand, refers to a single individual holding the 
combined “CEO and Chairman of the Board” title. 
2.1.  Benefits and Costs of Dual v.s. Unitary Leadership 
Proponents of dual leadership base their arguments on the claim that combining 
the titles of CEO and chairman of the board results in the CEO grading his own 
homework1 (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997) and thus increasing managerial discretion 
                                                 
1 As Brickley Coles and Jarrell (1997) also note, this schoolwork reference is attributable to Blenyth 
Jenkins, the director of Corporate Affairs for a London based trade group, who was quoted in the below 
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while decreasing the monitoring efficiency of the board of directors.  In other words, 
separating the roles of CEO and chairman leads to a more objective evaluation of the 
CEO and creates an environment for greater accountability.  In the post-Enron financial 
environment, this argument finds more spotlight with the SEC trying to enforce tougher 
corporate-governance standards, and the financial media like the Wall Street Journal2 
advocating separation of combined CEO/chairman titles.   
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that agency costs can be reduced by institutional 
arrangements that separate decision management from decision control. These terms 
respectively refer to the right to initiate and implement resource allocation decisions and 
the right to ratify and monitor the implementation of these decisions.  Thus, dual 
leadership, with a separate CEO and a chairman, is a means to achieve such institutional 
decision control mechanisms. 
Though scant and mixed, there is some empirical evidence showing that 
separating the titles of CEO and chairman of the board improves firm performance.  Pi 
and Timme (1993) examine a sample of 112 banks, 25% of which have dual leadership, 
over the 1987 – 1990 period.  After controlling for firm size and other relevant variables, 
they find evidence that costs are lower and return on assets is higher for firms with 
separate CEO and chairman titles.  Similarly, Rechner and Dalton (1991) examining the 
differential financial implications of dual/unitary leadership decisions for 141 
corporations over a six-year time period, find that firms opting for dual leadership 
                                                                                                                                                 
cited New York Times article as follows: “One of the major functions of the board is to supervise 
management.  If the Chairman of the Board is also in management, then he is in effect making his own 
exam papers.” (“Balancing the power at the top. British Style” by Richard Stevenson, New York Times, 
Sunday, November 15, 1992) 
 
2 See, for example, “Splitting posts of Chairman, CEO catches on” by John S. Lubin, Wall Street Journal, 
November 11, 2001, page B-1.)   
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consistently outperform the firms with unitary leadership.  Baliga, Moyer and Rao 
(1996), analyze 181 industrial companies over the 1986-1991 period, and find some 
evidence that leadership structure matters: that firms that switch to dual leadership have 
better long-term performance than firms that maintain unitary combined leadership.  This 
evidence is weak, however, and since they fail to find significant changes in market value 
or operating performance around changes in duality status, the authors conclude overall 
that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that dual leadership leads to better 
firm performance. 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) challenge this evidence, and find that while 
about 14% of the firms have separate titles, most of these firms are simply transitioning 
to new CEOs, where good performing CEOs are eventually granted both titles.  Thus, the 
frequency of separate titles and the tests associated with it are potentially overstating the 
evidence.   
Most opponents of dual leadership base their arguments on the costs of having 
two heads.  They believe that a board of directors will be run more efficiently and less 
costly with combined CEO/chairman positions.  Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) also 
specify these costs associated with dual leadership:  
• Agency costs of monitoring the non-CEO chairman.  In the spirit of Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), ‘who monitors the monitor?’, the shareholders will now 
have to incur the additional cost of monitoring the chairman and making sure 
he acts in their best interests. 
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• The information costs associated with the costly and incomplete transfer of 
the critical strategic information between the CEO and the chairman.   
Information transfer will be costly between the CEO and the chairman. 
• The actual costs of the CEO succession process itself within the company. 
• The confusion of having two leaders of the company. 
2.2. Probationary (Relay-Type) Succession Processes 
Vancil (1987) names the common succession process in U.S. companies as 
“passing the baton.”  In this process,3 where the incumbent/former CEO, who has 
recently relinquished the CEO title to the heir apparent4, or  – passed the baton,  – retains 
the title of chairman of the board during a probationary period in order to allow the board 
to better monitor the new CEO in action as well as pass down any relevant information to 
the new CEO.  In essence, the former CEO, helps the Board put his successor to a test 
and if or when the new CEO passes this test, he is awarded with the combined title of 
CEO/chairman while the former chairman steps off the Board.  Vancil (1987) also argues 
that this transition period during which the CEO and chairman titles are separate is 
structured to readily oust the new CEO in case he “drops the baton,” or fails the test. 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) test Vancil’s (1987) passing-the-baton 
hypothesis indirectly and find that dual leadership firms have younger CEOs with shorter 
tenure, who own less stock and receive lower compensation levels with respect to 
combined CEO/chairman of the firms in their sample with unitary leadership structures.  
Also, most of the separate chairmen in their sample are former CEOs or people with 
                                                 
3 Most of the relay race analogies are originated in Vancil’s 1987 book, Passing the Baton: Managing the 
Process of CEO Succession, but have continued into the literature.  Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) and 
Naveen (2003) also use the same terminology. 
4 The heir apparent, in most cases, is the chief operating officer (COO) or the president of the company, and 
the new CEO in the first couple of years of his tenure usually carries such an operating title as well. 
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detailed knowledge of the company and relatively high stock ownership, and that the 
titles are separated only when the information and agency costs of dual leadership are 
low.  Thus, they conclude that separating the titles of CEO and chairman of the board is 
usually a part of the succession process of CEOs.  In other words, passing-the-baton is a 
prevalent strategy and the main reason for the existence of dual leadership in most firms. 
Additionally, in contrast to the previous empirical studies, Brickley, Coles and 
Jarrell (1997) find no evidence that unitary leadership structures lead to inferior 
accounting or market returns.  They find instead that changes in leadership structures 
have no systematic effects on stock prices.  If anything, their findings suggest that dual 
leadership is associated with systematically lower cash flows and value. 
Naveen (2003) analyzes the factors that influence the choice of succession plans 
and finds that firms that are more human capital specific and firms that operate in more 
heterogeneous industries are more likely to have planned succession processes and are 
more likely to choose inside successors.  Moreover, she finds succession planning to be 
more likely in larger and more diversified firms. 
2.3. Probationary (Relay-Type) Succession Processes and Agency Costs 
One aspect of the probationary succession process that is not thoroughly 
examined previously is the phasing out of the former CEO, and the incentives associated 
with this process.  Vancil (1987) discusses the emotional burden on the incumbent CEO 
of stepping out and identifies it as an exit barrier that needs to be mitigated by some 
prospect of emotional satisfaction after stepping down.  First, Vancil (1987) argues that 
the CEO might be reluctant to give up the perquisites that come with the CEO office.  
Also, the status of the office entitles the CEO to a very select peer group with a broad set 
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of useful contacts.  Most importantly, unless the CEO has already started planning for 
retirement, stepping down presents the prospect of being unemployed and not having 
something to do. 
Similarly, Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) argue that while prospects for 
promotion provide incentives to lower-level managers in the U.S. and in Japan, 
promotion incentives do not exist for top managers.  The only mechanism that might 
provide promotion-like incentives is the prospect of being retained on the board of 
directors after retirement.  Yet, these incentives can only exist if the retention decision is 
based on the top manager’s performance during active employment.  Their results 
suggest a positive and statistically significant relation between post-retirement board 
service and performance for retiring managers in both countries.  They find that retention 
on the CEO’s own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside 
boards is better explained by accounting returns.  Thus, top managers’ career concerns do 
not necessarily end at retirement. 
Thus, the former CEO in a probationary succession process has incentives to 
encourage his successor to follow in his footsteps and continue the projects he has 
worked hard to prosper, signaling that the investments, policies and decisions made 
during his time are profitable. Simultaneously he would discourage his successor from 
making major policy changes that would imply poor management on his part.  In other 
words, the retiring CEO still has his reputational capital at stake upon becoming the 
chairman of the board of directors.  These may lead the former CEO to be more reluctant 
in passing down relevant information, thus increasing information costs mentioned by 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997).   Similarly, they may lead the chairman into trying to 
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block some of the decisions of the new CEO by lobbying against him in the board, and 
thus increasing agency costs.  On the other hand, even if the former CEO does not 
perceive his reputation at stake, he is very likely to believe in the real merit of his policies 
and decisions, and thus try to make sure his successor follows and even improves upon 
them, naively believing that it is in the best interests of the company.  Consequently, a 
passing-the-baton type of succession plan may provide healthy companies that are 
managed well with a smooth and efficient succession.  Simultaneously, they might be 
very hazardous to companies that are not healthy, and need fundamental changes. 
Furthermore, successful implementation of policies requires a good understanding 
of and extensive experience with the specific production technologies of the firm and its 
product markets.  Most executives, in addition to having worked for the firm, may have 
invested in assets that they believe to be more valuable under their management than 
under the management of others (Schleifer and Vishny, 1989).  This would increase the 
probability of managerial conformism behavior and increase the agency costs of a 
passing-the-baton type succession  process (Parrino, 1997). 
Monks and Minow (2001) note that in 27% of the S&P 500 companies, a former 
CEO remains as a board member, and six companies even have two former CEOs serving 
on their board.5  Monks and Minow (2001) portray the problems related to the retired 
CEO serving on the board of his own company as a Catch-22 for the retired CEO:  “The 
retired CEO that cares about his successor will not be an objective and effective director.  
On the other hand, retired CEOs that want to dominate the board should not be on the 
board in the first place.” 
                                                 
5 Monks and Minow (2001) obtain these numbers from a 1991 Institutional Shareholder Services, a 
consulting firm that advises investors on corporate governance issues, survey of S&P 500 firms. 
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Vancil (1987) presents an example of how CEOs will sometimes do everything in 
their power to make sure their successor keeps their policies and dreams alive.  For 
instance, he notes that Ben Branch, the CEO of Dow Chemicals from 1971 to 1976 
enhanced the presence of Dow Chemicals in Europe, made Dow Europe powerful and the 
center of corporate policy and the hallmark of his own career.  Therefore, when he 
decided to step down from the CEO position a couple of months early, he influenced the 
board to vote for the then-president of Dow Europe, a European himself, Zoltan Merszei, 
as his successor, in spite of all the management team’s reluctance to do so.  During the 
two years, he stayed as chairman of the board after that, Branch tried to make sure the 
European growth project took the topmost priority in the firm’s agenda, and Merszei 
stayed in position to run it while he discarded the frictions that arose within the top 
management and the board.  Finally, when it became obvious that Merszei could not hold 
the CEO position any longer, Ben Branch himself had to resign from the chairman 
position to allow Merszei’s resignation from the office of CEO (Vancil, 1987). This 
example also illustrates how passing-the-baton type succession process can trigger the 
ousting of a new CEO that fails to the test or “drops the baton”. 
The resemblance of the succession plan to a test gives the former CEO, the 
current chairman, the incentives and the power to exert pressure on the new CEO to make 
him conform to his norms and rules6.  Vancil (1987) states this problem as: 
“The new CEO may also feel some pain [during the transition period].  He 
is ready to get on with his own tenure and may feel constrained about 
                                                 
6 This problem has been named in literature as managerial conformism and succession-securing behavior.  
Usually, when the new CEO conforms to the status quo, it is named managerial conformism.  On the other 
hand, if the old CEO, somehow enforces conformity, it has been named succession-securing behavior.   I 
have tried to use managerial conformism throughout the text, but both terms have been used 
interchangeably in the literature, usually based on who the initiator of the conformist behavior tends to be. 
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proposing new initiatives or disposing of past mistakes while his 
predecessor, who is responsible for those sins, is still in the room and 
practically running the meeting” Vancil (1987). 
Sonnenfeld (1988) analyzes the retirement patterns of over 300 CEOs of top U.S. 
companies with personal interviews, questionnaires and objective data from proxy 
statements.  He argues that the CEO himself makes the decision to stay on the board, and 
asserts that poorly performing CEOs are among the most likely to stay on the board, 
because their visions for the company remain unfulfilled.   
Naveen (2003) documents that the tenure of the heir apparent, the time between 
the heir apparent’s appointment as COO or president, and his subsequent appointment as 
CEO, is longer in firms with relay-type succession processes.  Similarly, she finds 
abnormal returns at the announcement of CEO turnover to be lower for firms with relay 
type planned succession processes.  Though she concludes that these results imply greater 
information transfer needs, she cannot rule out the lengthening effect of managerial 
entrenchment on the length of heir apparent tenure. 
In summary, passing-the-baton style succession processes are used widely by U.S. 
corporations.  The incumbent CEO and chairman of the board initially relinquishes only 
his CEO title to an heir apparent for a probationary period.  During this probationary 
period, the departing CEO remains as the chairman of the board and serves alongside the 
incoming CEO.  Upon successful completion of this probationary period, the new CEO 
gets awarded the chairman of the board title as well, and the firm goes back to unitary 
leadership.  While the probationary period in these successions facilitates improved 
information transfer between the departing and incoming executives and a closer 
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monitoring of the new executive while he gets acclimated, it may also create agency costs 
for the firm.  The departing chairmen have incentives to make sure their successor 
conforms to their goals and standards.  Though such managerial conformism may be 
beneficial for healthy and stable firms by maintaining the high standards, it may be 
detrimental for firms that are in need of managerial change.  The following chapter 
develops and states specific hypotheses about how such managerial conformism would 
affect firms as well as the factors that determine the level of managerial conformism in 
relay-race type probationary succession processes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS 
 
This chapter of my dissertation develops specific hypotheses on how managerial 
conformism manifests itself in companies that utilize passing-the-baton style managerial 
succession processes.  Section 3.1 presents the hypotheses on the existence of managerial 
conformism and agency costs in probationary succession processes, while section 3.2 
develops hypotheses on the factors that affect the level of managerial conformism. 
3.1. Existence of Managerial Conformism and Agency Costs During Probationary 
(Relay-Type) Succession Processes 
 
If managerial conformism exists in firms with probationary succession processes, 
then the performance of these firms would be affected.  Performance is measured using 
operating performance, abnormal stock returns and the number of policy decisions.  In 
short, if the new CEOs conform to the status quo of the firm during their probationary 
period, the performance of these firms should remain unchanged during the probationary 
period.  Yet, performance is expected to increase significantly once the new CEO passes 
the test and gets the combined CEO and chairman of the board title.   
Managerial conformism is not necessarily detrimental to the firm, however.  The 
reaction from the rivals of the firm would determine whether managerial conformism is 
necessarily a bad thing.  Stock prices of rival firms should react positively if managerial 
conformism is detrimental to my sample firm, and react negatively if conformism is 
expected to have good results for the sample firm.  The following sections develop these 
hypotheses in detail. 
3.1.1. Operating Performance 
 
Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2001) provide evidence that measures of abnormal 
accounting performance in firms decline before managerial turnover events yet improve 
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subsequently after the turnover.  They also find that the managerial turnover 
announcements are associated with significantly positive abnormal stock returns.  These 
returns are positively related to subsequent changes in accounting performance, 
suggesting that investors typically view turnover announcements as good news because 
they anticipate that the turnover will prompt performance improvements.   
If agency conflicts between the chairman (retired CEO) and the new CEO lead to 
managerial conformism, then the new CEO is expected to act along the lines of his 
predecessor at least until he gets the combined title.  In this case, there should be no 
significant changes in the operating performance of the firm.  However, when the 
probationary period is over and the new CEO has the combined title, he has less pressure 
(incentives) to conform.  Therefore his potential improvements in the firm are expected to 
surface and operating performance of the firm is expected to improve. 
H1: If managerial conformism exists in passing-the-baton type CEO 
successions, there should be no significant change in the operating 
performance of the firm during the probationary period. 
H2:  If managerial conformism exists in passing-the-baton type CEO 
successions, there should be a significant increase in the operating 
performance of the firm upon the conclusion of the probationary period when 
the new CEO gets the combined CEO/chairman title. 
According to Vancil (1987) passing-the-baton type succession processes also help 
the board of directors to effectively oust the new CEO at the end of the probationary 
process if he drops the baton.  In this case, decisions to oust the new CEO are expected to 
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be accompanied by significant decreases in operating performance during the 
probationary period. 
H3: If, in fact, succession processes are probationary, then declines in 
operating performance during the probationary period are expected to be 
followed by the new CEO being ousted.   
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) argue that accounting and stock performances 
of the firm affect the post-retirement careers of top-level managers differently.  They find 
that retention on the CEO’s own board is primarily dependent on stock returns, while the 
service on outside boards depends more on accounting measures.  Since retiring CEOs 
would like to pursue either path, or sometimes both paths at the same time, I would 
expect both accounting and stock based measures of operating performance to exhibit 
similar effects. 
3.1.2. Policy Decisions 
Since most of the reputation of a CEO depends on the policies he implements, the 
former CEO (incumbent chairman) would like to ensure those policies are kept and 
followed.  Additionally, the new CEO would have incentives to conform and keep the 
status quo to curry favor and pass the transition period as quickly as possible.  Thus, there 
should be significantly more numerous policy changes after the transition period is over 
and the new CEO obtains both titles.   
H4: If managerial conformism exists in passing-the-baton type CEO 
successions, there should be no significant change in the number of major 
policy decisions made by the firm during the probationary period. 
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H5:  If managerial conformism exists in passing-the-baton type CEO 
successions, there should be a significant increase in the number of major 
policy decisions made by the firm upon the conclusion of the probationary 
period when the new CEO gets the combined CEO/chairman title. 
3.1.3. Rival Firms’ Reactions 
Managerial conformism is not necessarily costly.  For an established, stable 
corporation that has been performing better than their industry average under their current 
management, making sure the newcomer conforms to the status quo may not be 
detrimental.  Having the departing CEO continue to serve on the board as chairman can 
reduce information transfer costs and lead to a smooth succession in these firms.   
Accordingly, Parrino (1997), Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2001) and Naveen (2003), 
find that probationary succession processes tend to be concentrated more in 
heterogeneous industries with large and established firms, while outside succession is 
more likely to occur in more homogeneous industries with lower human capital needs.   
However, for firms that have been underperforming their industry, the costs of 
managerial conservatism can be higher and succession-securing behavior can be 
detrimental.  In this case, the close competitors of the firm in the same industry should 
react positively to the company’s managerial turnover announcement.  Similarly, if 
managerial succession is not expected to be detrimental to the firm, then the rivals should 
react negatively to the announcement. 
H6:  Announcements of potentially costly managerial conformism are 
expected to be accompanied by a positive stock price reaction from the firm’s 
competitors, while announcements of potentially beneficial managerial 
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conformism are expected to be accompanied by a negative price reaction from 
competitors. 
3.2. Factors that Affect the Level of Managerial Conformism 
The more incentive conflicts that arise between the incumbent and the new CEO, 
the harder it would be for the new CEO to successfully complete the probationary period.  
Thus, the probationary period would take longer.  The length of the probationary period 
will increase with the level of incentive conflicts and agency costs during the 
probationary period.  
H7:  The probationary period should be longer, the higher the level of agency 
conflicts between the incumbent and the new CEO. 
3.2.1. Departing CEO or Chairman Stock Ownership 
The conflicts of interest between the former and the new CEOs in a passing-the-
baton process, may lead to increased informational asymmetries and agency costs 
between the CEO and the board of directors.  This would bring into question the 
efficiency of the Board of Directors as a mechanism to monitor top management and to 
reduce the agency costs between the managers and the shareholders.  Thus, in the spirit of 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), ‘who monitors the monitor?’: If the chairman is a large 
residual claimant, then this problem is solved as in the classical model of the 
entrepreneurial owner, but in the large complex company, it is generally the case that no 
one on the board of directors has greater reputational and financial capital at stake in the 
future performance in the company than does the CEO.  As the percentage share 
ownership of the former CEO or the current chairman declines, agency conflicts between 
the chairman and the CEO are likely to increase.  In this case, the presence of outside 
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board members and their effectiveness in monitoring the CEO and the chairman become 
crucial issues in corporate governance.   
H8:  Higher stock ownership by the former CEO should align his incentives 
with those of the shareholders and reduce the probability of managerial 
conformism. 
3.2.2. Managerial Entrenchment 
The conflicts of interest between the departing and the incoming CEOs should be 
worse, the more entrenched the former CEO is to the company.  For example, if the 
former CEO is the founder of the company or a member of the founding family, and he is 
handing the office of the CEO to an out-of-the family director/manager/president, then he 
would have greater incentives to try to insure that his successor follows the policies 
maintained by the founding family for years, which the former CEO, the current 
chairman himself represents.  There are greater benefits to founding families from 
preserving control in their companies than to professional managers under any 
circumstance.  Burkart, Panunzi and Shelifer (2003) identify these benefits as: 
• Amenity potential, using the term coined by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), where 
there are non-pecuniary private benefits of control, meaning extra utility for 
the founder that does not come at the expense of profits.  Founder may take 
personal joy at seeing his son run the company that bears the family name. 
• Name itself as a carrier of reputation in economic, political and social 
environments.  Such reputational benefits will be diluted if control of the 
company is surrendered to an outsider. 
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• Possibility of expropriation of outside investors comes with control (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and these benefits come at the expense of profits 
accruing to outside investors.  If professional management is employed, then 
it is now the professional manager, not the founding family that has control of 
the company and can expropriate outside investors. 
Empirically, Andersen and Reeb (2003) find evidence that when founding family 
members serve as the CEOs of their firms, firm performance is better than when the CEO 
is an outsider. 
H9:  If the departing CEO is a founding family member, the likelihood of 
managerial conformism should be higher. 
H10: If the departing CEO is a family member and the new CEO is a non-
family member, then the probability of managerial conformism should be 
higher than it would be if the incoming CEO is another family member. 
Managers get more entrenched to their firms the longer they are employed by the 
firm or the longer they stay in a certain office.  Thus, the longer the former CEO has been 
in office, the greater would be his attachment to the projects he has started or the policies 
he has implemented.  Simultaneously, a more entrenched departing CEO, whether a 
member of the founding family or with long tenure, would have closer relationships with 
board members.  Thus, he would have a greater influence on the directors, increasing his 
chances of influencing the new CEO while decreasing the effectiveness of the board as a 
monitoring entity.  In both cases, the entrenched departing CEO would have a greater felt 
presence in the corporate culture, which would also increase the incentives of the new 
CEO to conform. 
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H11: The longer the departing CEO has been in office, the greater should be 
the likelihood of managerial conformism. 
H12: The longer the departing CEO has been an employee of the firm, the 
more entrenched he is, and the greater should be the likelihood of managerial 
conformism. 
3.2.3. The Incomer’s Stock Ownership and Entrenchment to the Company 
In most cases, the incoming CEO is an heir apparent, usually the COO or the 
president of the firm.  The incoming CEO, therefore, has some (and occasionally 
significantly long) tenure in the firm.  In these cases, problems of managerial conformism 
should be alleviated to a certain degree, since the incoming CEO also has a certain level 
of attachment and entrenchment to the firm.  Especially, if the incoming CEO has 
significant stock ownership in the firm, then his incentives would be aligned with those 
of the shareholders.  This may reduce managerial conformism to a certain degree.   
H13: The longer the incoming CEO has been an employee of the firm, the 
lower should be the likelihood of managerial conformism. 
H14: The higher the stock ownership of the incoming CEO, the lower should 
be the likelihood of managerial conformism. 
 3.2.4. Effective Board and Outside Monitoring 
The effectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring the top-management will 
decrease the probability of managerial conformism.  Increasing board size decreases the 
monitoring efficiency of the board of directors on management (Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992), Jensen (1993)).  Both papers argue that as the number of directors on the board of 
a company increases, boards become less effective monitors.  This, in turn increases the 
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power of the CEO and thus increases the likelihood of managerial conformism. 
Consistent with these arguments, Yermack (1996) documents a negative relationship 
between board size and Tobin’s Q.   
H15: The larger the size of the firm’s board of directors, the higher should be 
the likelihood of managerial conformism. 
The proportion of outside directors on the board, on the other hand, increases the 
monitoring effectiveness of the board, and thus lowers the likelihood of managerial 
conformism.  Consistent with this hypothesis, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) document that 
firms with more outsiders on their boards award directors more equity based 
compensation, aligning their incentives better with the shareholders.  They argue that this 
is because outside directors have a greater bargaining power over the CEOs. If directors 
incentives are more aligned with those of the shareholders, they are likely to be better 
monitors of the management, decreasing the likelihood for managerial conformism. 
H16: The higher the percentage of outside directors in the board of directors, 
the lower should be the probability of managerial conformism. 
Similarly, as institutional stock ownership increases, agency costs decrease.  The 
cost of monitoring management is lower for institutional investors, making them an 
independent source of monitoring on behalf of the shareholders.  Therefore, firms with 
higher institutional holdings are less likely to experience costly managerial conformism. 
H17: The higher the institutional ownership in the firm, the lower should be the 
probability of managerial conformism. 
As stock holdings of board members increase, their interests become more aligned 
with those of the shareholders, increasing the monitoring efficiency of the board of 
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directors.  Perry (1999) documents that stock based compensation for outside directors 
increases the likelihood of CEO turnover and improves the monitoring quality of the 
board in general by aligning the interests of the directors with those of the shareholders.   
H18: The higher the stock ownership of non-CEO, non-chairman board 
members, the lower should be the likelihood of managerial conformism. 
3.2.5. Post-retirement Career Opportunities 
The retention of a departing CEO on his own board or his employment on the 
board of another firm depends on the performance of his firm during his tenure as the 
CEO.  Therefore departing CEO will have incentives to encourage managerial 
conformism during the probationary period in order to secure their future employment.   
H19: Retiring chairmen that remain on their own boards after they relinquish 
the chairmen title are expected to have stronger incentives for managerial 
conformism. 
H20: Retiring chairmen that serve on boards of directors of other firms should 
have stronger incentives to promote managerial conformism. 
On the other hand, an efficient labor market will consider the succession-securing 
incentives of the former CEO that stays on as the chairman of the board.  Therefore, such 
CEOs would be less likely to end up in comparable board membership positions.  
Therefore, the post-retirement career of the chairman can provide a measure of his 
reputation, and might work to reduce the incentives to ensure managerial conformism. 
3.2.6. Ease of Comparison and Monitoring 
It would be easier and less costly to hire outsiders for top executive positions in 
markets that are more homogeneous and in industries that are less human capital 
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intensive.  Information transfer costs are lower in these markets, making outside 
succession a more feasible alternative.  Thus, managerial conformism would be less 
likely in homogeneous industries.  Parrino (1997), Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2001) 
and Naveen (2003), find that probationary succession processes tend to be concentrated 
more in heterogeneous industries with large and established firms, while outside 
succession is more likely to occur in more homogeneous industries with lower human 
capital needs.  Parrino (1997) uses the correlation between common stock returns within 
two-digit SIC industries as a proxy for industry homogeneity.  Additionally, information 
transfer costs are higher in industries with more firm-specific human capital, which 
makes outside succession harder in these industries and increases the probability of 
managerial conformism. 
H21: Larger and older firms should be more likely to have probationary 
planned succession processes.   
Firms with more complex organizational structures, such as diversified firms, 
require a high level of firm-specific human capital.  Naveen (2003) and Berry, Bizjak, 
Lemmon and Naveen (2003) argue that diversified firms are more likely to appoint an 
insider as CEO and are more likely to engage in succession planning.  Similarly, 
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) provide evidence that the post-retirement employment 
opportunities of executives on other firms’ boards are dependent on accounting returns 
and probability of retention on their own boards is based on stock returns.  Since 
diversified firms are harder to compare to competitors, the evaluation criteria become 
vaguer, increasing the stakes and the agency conflicts.  Furthermore, since diversified 
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firms are harder to monitor, they are more prone to agency conflicts and succession 
securing behavior.   
H22: Diversified firms are harder to monitor, so they should have higher 
succession-related agency costs. 
Information asymmetries between the managers and the market are greater in 
firms with high growth potentials, which makes them harder to monitor.  Therefore, firms 
with high growth opportunities are expected to have higher probabilities of managerial 
conformism. 
H23: Firms with higher market-to-book ratios would be harder to monitor so 
should have a higher probability of managerial conformism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
4.1.1. Management Data 
The initial sample for this dissertation includes all the firms that have announced 
a change to their top management positions, namely CEOs and chairmen of the board, 
during the period from 1993 to 1995.  I gather the firms to be included in the sample 
using a keyword search on Lexis-Nexis of the major news and wiring resources for news 
announcements and articles containing the words, ‘CEO’, ‘chief executive’ or ‘chairman’ 
and verbs such as ‘choose’, ‘appoint’, ‘name’, ‘select’, ‘retire’, ‘resign’, ‘elect’ or ‘leave’ 
for the years 1993 through 19957.    I then classify the firms as dual leadership firms, 
firms that change either their CEO or chairman or both, unitary leadership firms that 
change their chairman/CEO, or firms that change from unitary to dual leadership or vice 
versa.  Of the firms that change from unitary to dual leadership or vice versa, I separate 
those that are following a planned relay-type succession plan as the passing-the-baton 
sample.  I identify the firms with probationary succession processes from the explanation 
in the news article or by following the company through the years in both Lexis Nexis 
and in proxy statements.  If the managerial turnover announcement specifically states that 
the departing CEO remains on the board as the chairman, I follow it through on Lexis-
Nexis to determine the time boundaries on the probationary period.  This yields a sample 
of 2,154 announcements by 1,923 firms. After excluding the announcements made by 
                                                 
7 Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) are the first to use such a methodology.  They search for Wall Street 
Journal announcements containing the words ‘chief executive officer’ and ‘chairman’ and the verbs 
‘choose, appoint, name or select’.  The methodology utilized in this paper improves upon their 
methodology.  This proves to be a more comprehensive sample than just using the 800-1000 firms in the 
Forbes Executive Surveys like most of the previous literature. 
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foreign or private firms and subsidiaries that do not trade separately, I have a sample of 
1,339 announcements by 1,295 firms. 
I verify the events and their dates by their appearance in the Wall Street Journal, 
and assume the event day to be the first day any news of the managerial change appears 
in the Wall Street Journal or any other major news wire or source.  From the remaining 
1,339 announcements, I remove the 44 announcements made about CEO or chairman 
changes around reorganizations, bankruptcies or going private transactions where public 
information is not available.  Of the remaining 1,293 managerial changes, 527 (40.76 %) 
are passing-the-baton type probationary succession processes; 458 are announcements 
made by firms that have a dual leadership structure and are changing either their 
chairmen or CEOs or both; and  208 (16.08 %) announcements are from firms that have 
unitary leadership, and the same individual that holds the CEO and chairman title 
changes.   In the 458 announcements from dual leadership firms, 287 (62.66 %) announce 
a change of only the CEOs while the chairmen stay the same; 119 (25.98%) announce a 
change in the chairmen while the CEOs stay the same; and the remaining 52 (11.35 %) 
announce a change of both their CEOs and chairmen at the same time.  The remaining 
100 announcements in the sample are separated as 73 announcements of firms with 
unitary leadership separating their titles (not for a probationary period but rather 
permanently) and 27 announcements from firms with dual leadership that combine the 
CEO and chairmen titles. 
 I then follow the succession process of every firm through using news articles 
about the firm in Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal Corporate Index, as well as the 
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managerial and board membership changes stated in proxy statements.  For the passing-
the-baton sample, I identify two dates:  
? date when the former CEO and chairman of the board relinquishes the CEO 
position to his heir apparent to remain as the chairman of the board (beginning 
date for the probationary period) 
? date when the chairman (former CEO) finally retires from executive duties by 
retiring as the chairman as well and the new CEO is granted the combined 
CEO and chairman of the board title (ending date of the probationary period)   
Interim office holders are not included in the sample.  However, if the interim 
CEO or chairman becomes the permanent office holder, then the period of time they have 
been in office (or in other words, the time they are appointed) is adjusted to include the 
period where they serve as an interim officer.   For example, when J.P. Bolduc, the chief 
executive of W.R. Grace & Co resigned from his duties on March 2, 1995, the board 
appointed Thomas Holmes, a senior vice president of the firm at the time, to succeed 
Bolduc for a temporary period.  Thomas Holmes was appointed as the permanent CEO of 
W.R. Grace & Co on November 12, 1995.  In this case, I use the initial date of 
appointment, March 2, 1995 as the date Holmes becomes the CEO of W.R. Grace & Co.  
Similarly, if the interim CEO is part of a passing-the-baton process, and he becomes the 
permanent CEO, the length of his probationary period has been adjusted to include the 
time when he served as an interim or acting chief executive.  On the other hand, if the 
interim office holder is replaced eventually for a permanent placement, I exclude the 
interim office holder from the sample, and treat these two announcements as one single 
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succession process.  This process reduces the sample size from 1,293 announcements to 
1,057 announcements made by 978 firms. 
I note the reason for every CEO or chairman departure. Following Naveen 
(2003), I classify all CEO departures that are reported in the financial press as forced 
departures as such.  Additionally, I consider any departure of a CEO under the age of 60 
leaving for reasons other than death, health, family matters or acceptance of any position 
within or outside the firm are considered as forced departures. 
I obtain the information on the ages and tenures of the CEOs and chairmen at the 
time they are appointed and when they retire as well as the total time they have worked 
for the company from the news announcements and double-check them with the 
information from proxy statements.  Table 1 presents a summary of all the data used in 
this dissertation and their sources. 
Additionally, I collect information on the origins of the new CEOs and chairmen 
from the news announcements and proxy statements.  For companies that choose to 
promote from within, I note the last office the new CEO has held.  If the new CEO is an 
outsider, then I identify the company the new CEO comes from.  In addition to the names 
of the companies, I create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the new CEO 
or chairman is an outsider.  In my sample, the new CEOs recruited from other companies 
tend to be either from companies in the same industry or partners of management 
consulting, accounting/auditing or law firms of which he company is a major client.  I 
create different dummy variables for each of these cases. 
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Table 4.1 
List of Variables and Their Sources 
This table presents the main groups of data used in this dissertation and the various sources it is obtained 
from.  The details of the searches and the exact variables collected from these sources are detailed in the 
text.  This table provides a summary. 
 
Data Source 
Exact dates of succession details Lexis-Nexis news announcements 
Details of the succession process Lexis-Nexis news announcements and 
proxy statements 
Reason for managerial departure Lexis-Nexis news announcements 
Manager’s age Lexis-Nexis news announcements and 
proxy statements 
Manager’s tenure Lexis-Nexis news announcements and 
proxy statements 
Manager’s time spent with the company Lexis-Nexis news announcements and 
proxy statements 
Origin of the new manager Lexis-Nexis news announcements and 
proxy statements 
Post-retirement careers of departing 
managers 
Lexis-Nexis news announcements and 
proxy statements 
Firm’s board size Proxy statements 
Percentage of outside directors on board Proxy statements 
Percentage share ownership of executives Proxy statements 
Accounting data Research Insight 
Stock return data CRSP 
Industry specification (SIC codes) Research Insight 
Number of business segments of the firm Research Insight 
Institutional Ownership Compact disclosure 
Number of policy decisions Lexis-Nexis news announcements 
 
 
Furthermore, I follow the post-retirement careers of the departing CEOs and 
chairmen in order to determine whether post-retirement careers provide incentives for 
them to encourage managerial conformism.  Most of this information is available through 
Lexis-Nexis searches of news announcements for the name of the chairmen and have 
been verified from proxy statements, when necessary.  Consistent with Brickley, Linck 
and Coles (1999) and Sonnenfeld (1988), retiring chairmen follow one of three paths: 
continue to serve on the boards of their own companies as chairmen emeriti, non-
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executive directors, chairmen of the executive committee or consultants and advisors; 
serve on the boards of other companies that they are either already part of before they 
retire or they become part of as they retire; or just retire or form their own small 
entrepreneurial business.  Reputational incentives are very low, if not nonexistent in the 
last scheme.  However, in the first two cases where the retiring chairmen continue to 
work as members of their own or other firms’ boards, reputational incentives underlying 
succession-securing behavior are influential.  I create dummy variables taking the values 
of one if the chairman continues on his own board and if he serves on other boards. 
Some firms with dual leadership that prefer to groom managers from within have 
an intermittent step between the titles of CEO and chairman of the board.  In these firms 
departing CEOs become vice-chairmen and stay on the board.  When the current 
chairman retires, the vice-chairman becomes the new chairman.  This is another form of 
relay-type processes where the CEO and chairman titles do not overlap.  I create another 
dummy variable denoting this type of succession process in order to distinguish these 
firms from other firms with dual leadership. 
4.1.2. Firm and Performance Data 
Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) find that retention on the CEO’s own board 
after retirement depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is 
better explained by accounting returns. Thus, I collect stock return data and accounting 
data used to measure the operating performance of the firm from the Center for Research 
on Security Prices (CRSP) and Research Insight (COMPUSTAT) databases respectively.   
Similarly, data for other firm specific variables, like firm age, the two-digit and 
four-digit primary SIC codes for the companies and the number of business segments, are 
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also from the Research Insight (COMPUSTAT) database. Institutional ownership 
information is collected from Compact Disclosure. 
I determine the numbers of policy changes during the transition period as well as 
the ones after the new CEO gets the combined title again using a keyword search on 
Lexis-Nexis news and wire sources for the news articles containing the name of each 
company.  I remove earnings announcements, financial report filings and reviews of the 
company by other institutions, including financial institutions, analyst forecasts and 
rating agencies.  I consider all other events as policy decisions, and use the number of 
policy changes during the transition (probationary) period and before the start of and after 
the completion of the transition period as separate variables. 
I gather other firm specific variables like board size, stock ownership of the 
chairman, the CEO and the board members as well as the existence and the percentage of 
outside directors from proxy statements of the firm published at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the announcement.  Board members that are (or have been) executive officers or 
direct employees of the firm, employees of direct customers or suppliers of the firm or 
members of the founding families that may have seats on the board are considered inside 
directors.  Additionally, I also consider employees of commercial or investment banks, 
venture capital firms, insurance companies, audit companies or law firms that may have 
direct business relationships with the firm as inside directors.  I classify the remaining 
independent board members as outside members. 
As mentioned in the previous section, managerial conformism is not always and 
necessarily detrimental to the performance of a firm.  For older, more stable firms with 
higher firm-specific human capital, managerial conformism can potentially be an 
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efficient means of information transfer between the top management of the firm.  The 
reaction of a firm’s rivals to the announcement of managerial turnover and relay-race 
type succession process should be related to whether managerial succession is costly to 
the company or potentially beneficial.  I determine the rivals of sample firms based on 
two-digit and four-digit SIC codes.  The accounting and stock price information for the 
rivals also come from the Research Insight (COMPUSTAT) and CRSP databases. 
Availability of proxy statements for all the necessary years as well as the 
availability of data on CRSP, Research Insight and Compact Disclosure simultaneously 
reduces the sample size in this dissertation to 475 announcements made by 473 
companies. 
4.2. Methodology 
This dissertation uses data from announcements made during 1993 through 1995 
in order to allow for a time period of at least three years after the new CEO has been 
granted both titles and sufficient time has passed for him to implement his policies and 
for changes in operating performance to occur.  For instance, Graco Inc announced on 
December 15, 1995 that its chairman and chief executive officer, David Koch has 
resigned from his executive duties, but he will remain as the chairman of the board of 
directors.  Koch and his successor as CEO, George Aristides, served together for a 
probationary period of approximately 2.5 years and Aristides was granted the combined 
CEO and chairman of the board title on June 23, 1998.  I allow for a period of at least 
three years after the new CEO obtains the combined title for comparison purposes, which 
brings data up to June 2001.   Therefore, for announcements made later than 1995, I may 
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run into data unavailability problems in cases of long probationary periods.  Thus, the 
time period for the announcements ends at the end of the year 1995.  
I use three years as the basis period for operating performance comparisons 
between different managers and different periods, since Gabarro (1987) finds three years 
to be the typical time period over which new executives introduce major changes to their 
organization8. 
I divide the sample into three major groups: relay-race type (probationary) 
managerial succession processes; managerial turnover in firms with dual leadership 
(either the CEO or the chairman changes or both change simultaneously); managerial 
turnover in unitary leadership firms where the manager holding the combined CEO and 
chairman title changes.   There are 203 (42.74 % of the sample) announcements of 
probationary or in other words passing-the-baton type, managerial successions.  The 
second category with dual leadership firms changing either their CEO, chairman or both 
simultaneously includes 90 announcements.  Of this 90 (18.95 % of the sample), 48 firms 
(53.33 %) change only their CEOs and 34 (37.78 %) change only their chairmen while 
only 8 firms (8.89 %) change both their CEOs and chairmen at the same time.  On the 
other hand, there are 128 firms where the single individual holding the combined 
CEO/chairman title is replaced by another individual holding the same combined title.  
Each one of these different methods of succession is analyzed in detail in the following 
chapter of the dissertation.   
The succession process in probationary type successions has three parts: 
                                                 
8 Khurana nad Nohria (2001) also follow this methodology and use three year periods. 
 - 36 - 
? The before period: three years prior to the announcement that departing CEO 
and chairman will relinquish his CEO title but will remain on the board as 
chairman. 
? The probationary period (transition period): the period where the old 
CEO/chairman remains as the chairman and his successor serves the firm as 
the CEO.  This is a temporary period of dual leadership in these firms that are 
generally run by a single unitary leader with a combined title.   
? The after period: three-year post-unification period, after the probationary 
period is completed successfully and the new CEO is granted the combined 
CEO and chairman of the board title. 
For dual-to-dual leadership and unitary-to-unitary leadership transitions, there are 
only two periods: a pre-turnover and a post-turnover period.  Again, I use a three-year 
window of operating performance to compare and contrast the performances under both 
managers. 
This dissertation explores two empirical questions: Does managerial conformism 
exist in probationary succession processes, and what factors affect the level and 
magnitude of managerial conformism?  First, I document the existence of managerial 
conformism using univariate tests of differences in mean and median measures of 
operating performance between the three periods of the probationary succession process. 
I use the number of policy decisions, changes in abnormal returns and changes in 
accounting operating performance between the transition period and the periods before 
succession starts and after the new CEO obtains the combined CEO/chairman title to 
conduct these tests. 
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Accounting operating performance measures are return on assets (ROA) and 
industry adjusted returns on assets (IAROA), following Baliga et al (1996) and Brickley, 
Linck and Coles (1999).9  Return on assets is the average return on assets over these 
periods, calculated as the net income divided by average assets.  Following Parrino 
(1997) and Naveen (2003), industry-adjusted return on assets have been defined as the 
average annual returns on assets net of the industry mean, where the industry is 
determined according to two-digit SIC codes.10  I also use the Barber and Lyon (1997) 
criteria to create matched samples of firms, and report both results in Chapter 6. 
Mean abnormal stock returns are the returns on the security reported by CRSP net 
of the returns on the CRSP value-weighted index, following Baliga et al (1996) and 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997), and industry adjusted mean abnormal returns are the 
mean abnormal returns net of the industry average mean abnormal returns for the 
corresponding period, using two-digit SIC codes to determine industry (Parrino, 1997).11  
Similar to accounting performance, I re-do the same analysis using Barber and Lyon 
(1997) matching criteria for robustness. 
The factors that determine the level of managerial conformism are determined as 
a result of multivariate regression analyses presented in Chapter 7.  I use the length of the 
probationary period as a dependent variable in regular OLS regressions. 
                                                 
9 Other measures of operating performance, like return on capital following Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 
(1997), return on equity (ROE) and return on investment (ROI) have been considered.  However, tests have 
revealed similar results with all three proxies, therefore only ROAs are reported. 
10 The industry-adjusted operating performance and market reaction variables are also calculated using 
four-digit SIC codes and the results are similar.  Therefore, to be consistent with previous literature, two-
digit SIC code based results are reported. 
11 The results for mean abnormal returns are checked for robustness by substituting the CRSP equally-
weighted index instead of the value-weighted index.  The empirical results remain unchanged under 
different market proxies, therefore, consistent with previous literature, only the results using the value-
weighted index are reported. 
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The dependent variable used in the logit regressions measuring the probability of 
managerial conformism equals one if the incumbent CEO of the company shows 
managerial conformism.  This variable is set to equal one if there is an increase in the 
number of policy changes after the transition period is over, there is a significant increase 
in the operating performance of the firm measured both by industry adjusted return on 
assets and industry adjusted returns.  
Sixteen different independent variables are considered to as proxies for the factors 
that affect the level of managerial conformism in firms.  However, due to the multi-
collinearity between these independent variables in the regressions, a principle 
components analysis has been conducted to yield five major components to be used in the 
rest of the analysis in Chapter 7.  The five components with eigenvalues greater than one 
have been included in the regressions that measure the level of managerial conformism in 
firms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND DETAILS OF MANAGERIAL 
SUCCESSION PROCESS IN THE U.S. 
 
 
Three main channels of CEO succession dominate the contemporary corporate 
world.  Firms that have a single individual holding the combined CEO and chairman of 
the board title either choose to follow a relay-race type (probationary) succession process 
or choose to replace their CEO and chairman with a new individual holding both titles.  
In a probationary succession process, the incumbent CEO and chairman of the board 
initially relinquishes only his CEO title to the heir apparent while maintaining his 
chairman of the board title.  The new CEO and the departing CEO, currently chairman, 
then manage the company together for a probationary period.  Upon successful 
completion of this period, the new CEO also obtains the chairman of the board title and 
the previous CEO retires from both of his duties.  On the other hand, a company with 
unitary leadership may choose to replace the individual holding the combined CEO and 
chairman of the board title with a new individual that will also immediately hold a 
combined CEO/chairman of the board title.  I have named this latter managerial turnover 
event as a unitary- to-unitary succession. 
Firms that have dual leadership structures, meanwhile, change either their CEOs 
only, their chairmen only or both simultaneously.  I refer to this group as dual-to-dual 
successions. The remaining succession announcements include firms that have unitary 
leadership structures, but announce that the separation of their CEO and chairman of the 
board titles.  Similarly, some announcements are by firms that have separate chairmen 
and CEOs and decide to combine the titles.  I grouped these firms under separation of 
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titles and unification of titles groups.  The details of these different succession processes 
are presented below. 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics: Entire Sample 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the entire sample.  CEO and chairmen ages, prior time spent in 
the firm and the departing CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and 
chairman share ownership and institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by 
the incumbent CEO and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the 
percentage of the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and 
the Chairman of the Board.  Probationary period is the number of years it takes for new CEO to be granted 
the combined CEO/Chairman of the Board title, during which the old and the new CEO work together.  
Board size is the number of directors that serve on the board of the firm.  The percentage of outside board 
members measures the proportion of directors on the Board of the firm that are not former employees of the 
firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  Market capitalization of the firms are also presented 
in millions of dollars.  Panel B displays the percentage of firms in the sample that prefer different 
succession types as well as the exchanges they trade on. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing Chairman Age 475 60.21 8.55 35 54 62 66 85 
Departing Chairman Tenure as 
Chairman 
475 8.26 7.67 0.08 3 6 11 47 
Departing Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
475 18.77 13.20 0.08 7 15 30 52 
Departing Chairman Share ownership 
(%) 
475 5.72 0.11 0 <1 1.30 6.10 68.20 
Departing CEO Age 475 58.32 8.63 35 52 60 65 78 
Departing CEO Tenure as CEO 475 8.18 7.52 0.08 3 6 11 47 
Departing CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
475 17.68 13.07 0.08 7 13 28 52 
Departing CEO Share Ownership (%) 475 4.56 9.22 0 <1 1.11 4.18 68.20 
Incoming Chairman Age 475 53.31 8.68 31 47 53 59 76 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
475 10.07 11.20 0 1 7 16 47 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
475 6.14 8.32 0 0.20 3 8 47 
Incoming Chairman Share ownership 
(%) 
475 3.92 9.96 0 <1 <1 2.77 91.01 
Incoming CEO Age 475 50.87 7.28 31 46 51 56 77 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
475 8.35 10.27 0 0 4 13 47 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
475 3.81 5.04 0 0 2 6 31 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 475 2.31 7.27 0 <1 <1 1.7 91.01 
Board Size 475 8.90 3.32 3 6 8 11 24 
Outside Board Members (%) 475 36.99 16.06 0 25 37.5 50 85.72 
Institutional Ownership (%) 475 31.78 14.67 0.31 11.93 37.92 55.45 91.03 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 475 6.94 11.23 <1 0.44 3 8.20 88.23 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 475 1512.75 5725 0.35 18.36 100.54 752.50 77591 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Passing-the-baton (probationary) succession 203 42.74% 
Unitary-to-unitary leadership succession 128 26.95% 
Dual-to-dual leadership  90 18.95% 
CEO change only 48 10.11% 
Chairman change only 34 7.18% 
Both CEO and chairman change simultaneously 8 1.68% 
Separation of leadership 39 8.21% 
Unification of leadership 15 3.16% 
Firm is listed on NYSE 226 47.58% 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 208 43.79% 
Firm is listed on AMEX 26 5.47% 
 
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of the sample across different succession 
methods as well as the descriptive statistics of the entire sample.  Out of the 475 different 
succession events included in my sample, 203 (42.74% of the entire sample) are 
probationary succession processes, while in 128 (26.95%) of the succession events, the 
individual holding the combined CEO and chairman of the board title is replaced in both 
functions by a new individual holding the same combined title.  This shows that 70% of 
the firms still prefer to have unitary leadership structures.  Out of the 90 firms (18.95%) 
in my sample that have dual leadership structures, more than half, 48 (10.11% of the 
entire sample), choose to change only their CEOs while their chairmen stay the same, 
while 34 firms (7.18% of the entire sample) change only their chairmen of the board 
while their CEOs stay the same.  Only eight firms out of my entire sample of 475 
(1.68%) choose to change both their CEO and chairman at the same time.  Of the 
remaining 54 firms, 39 (8.21% of the entire sample) separate their CEO and chairman of 
the board titles and move from a unitary to a dual leadership structure, whereas 15 
(3.16% of the entire sample) move the opposite way and combine their CEO and 
chairman of the board titles under one individual. 
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My sample is well distributed among firm sizes and exchanges as well.  The 
average (median) firm in my sample has a market capitalization of $1,512.75 ($100.54) 
millions.  Firm sizes range from $0.35 million in market capitalization to $77,591 
million.  Out of the 475 firms, 226 firms (47.58%) trade on the NYSE, 208 (43.79%) 
trade on NASDAQ and 26 firms (5.47%) trade on the AMEX.     
The average (median) age for departing chairmen in the overall sample is 60.21 
(62), and they served on average (median) 8.26 (6) years as chairmen and on average 
(median) 18.77 (15) years in various positions in their companies.  The departing CEOs 
are approximately two years younger, where the average (median) age of a departing 
CEO is 58.32 (60).  Most departing CEOs have on average (median) 8.18 (6) years tenure 
as CEOs and on average (median) 17.68 (13) years of service in the company.  The 
average (median) stock ownership for departing chairmen and CEOs is 5.72% (1.30%) 
and 4.56% (1.11%) respectively.   
The incoming chairmen are on average 6.82 years younger than the departing 
ones (this difference is significant with a t-statistic of 14.24).  The average (median) age 
of incoming chairmen of the board is 53.31 (53) and they have worked an average 
(median) of 10.07 (7) years in the firm, and have served an average (median) of 6.14 (3) 
years on the board of directors of these institutions.  Similarly, the incoming CEOs are on 
average 7.58 years younger than their predecessors (significant difference with a t-stat of 
16.17) with an average (median) 50.87 (51) years old.  They have an average (median) 
tenure of 8.35 (4) years in the firm and an average (median) tenure of 3.81 (2) years as 
directors on the board.  The incoming chairmen and CEOs have even lower shareholdings 
compared to their departing counterparts.  The percentage share ownership in the firm of 
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incoming chairmen and CEOs are on average (median) 3.92% (less than 1%) and 3.81% 
(2%), respectively. 
The firms in my sample have average (median) board sizes of 8.90 (8) members 
and on average (median) 36.99% (37.5%) of the directors on board are outsiders12.  The 
members of the board, except for the chairman and the CEO, own on average (median) 
6.94% (3%) of the outstanding stock in the firms in my sample.  Institutional investors, 
on the other hand, own on average (median) 31.78% (37.92%) of the shares in the firms 
in my sample. 
Firms included in may sample are evenly distributed through industries (See 
Table 5.2).  No single industry is dominant.  Chemical and allied products industry has 
the highest concentration of firms with 43 firms, less than 10 % of the sample belonging 
in that category.13 
5.1. Relay-race Type (Probationary) Managerial Succession 
In my sample, 203 out of the 475 managerial succession announcements are of 
probationary (passing-the-baton type) succession processes.  Table 5.3 presents the 
descriptive statistics for this sub-sample.  The departing CEOs in my sample are on 
average (median) 60 (63) years old and have been employed an average (median) of 20 
(17.5) years by their companies.  The mean (median) tenure of the departing CEO and 
Chairman as chairman on the board is 8.6 (7) years while his mean (median) tenure as the 
CEO is 9.7 (8) years. 
                                                 
12 Outside directors are defined as those directors who are not (have never been) employees of the 
company, and have no direct business relationship with the firm as a customer, supplier, shareholder, 
consultant, auditor, banker, investment banker, venture capitalist, attorney…etc. 
 
13 Similar industry classifications have been documented for each type of managerial succession.   No 
specific industry dominates any one of the succession methods, therefore they are not presented. 
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Table 5.2 
Industry Classifications for the Firms in the Sample 
 
This table presents the industry classification of the firms in the sample.  SIC codes are available for 399 
firms out of the 475 included in the sample, and the distribution of the firms across industries is provided 
based on their 2-digit SIC codes. 
 
Industry 2-digit 
SIC Code 
Number % of Sample 
Mining 10 5 1.05% 
Oil and Gas 13 9 2.95% 
Construction 15-17 3 0.63% 
Food Manufacturing 20 8 1.68% 
Tobacco 21 1 0.21% 
Textile and Apparel Manufacturing 22-23 8 1.68% 
Wood, paper and allied products 24-26 11 2.32% 
Printing and Publishing 27 6 1.26% 
Chemical and allied products 28 43 9.05% 
Petroleum, coal, rubber and leather 29-31 11 2.32% 
Stone and glass 32 4 0.84% 
Metal industries 33-34 6 1.26% 
Industrial Machinery and equipment 35 34 7.16% 
Electronics and other electronic equipment 36 33 6.95% 
Transportation 37 6 1.26% 
Instruments 38 22 4.63% 
Other manufacturing 39 7 1.47% 
Transportation  40-47 14 4.42 
Communication 48 4 0.84% 
Public utilities 49 19 4.00% 
Wholesale trade 50-52 15 3.16% 
Retail  trade 53-59 34 7.16% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 60-66 26 5.47% 
Holding companies 67 26 5.47% 
Personal Services 72 4 0.84% 
Business Services 73 23 4.84% 
Motion pictures and amusement and recreation services 78-79 5 1.05% 
Health services 80 6 1.26% 
Other services 81-89 6 1.26% 
 
Upon departure, the old CEOs and chairmen have on average (median) 4.9 % (1.35%) 
share ownership in the company.  More than 75 % of the departing chairmen in the 
probationary succession sample have less than 5% ownership in the company, and more 
than half have less than 1.5 %, making stock ownership an inadequate means to align the 
incentives of the departing chairmen with those of the shareholders.  Similarly, 118 
(58.13%) of the departing chairmen are 60 or older, in other words, close to retirement 
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age, consistent with Vancil’s (1987) description of the relay-race style succession process 
as mainly a planned smooth succession process.   
Table 5.3 
Probationary Succession Processes 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the passing the baton sample.  CEO ages, prior time spent in 
the firm and the departing CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and 
chairman share ownership and institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by 
the incumbent CEO and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the 
percentage of the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and 
the Chairman of the Board.  Probationary period is the number of years it takes for new CEO to be granted 
the combined CEO/Chairman of the Board title, during which the old and the new CEO work together.  
Board size is the number of directors that serve on the board of the firm.  The percentage of outside board 
members measures the proportion of directors on the Board of the firm that are not former employees of the 
firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  Sales and assets of the firms are also presented in 
millions of dollars.  Panel B presents the percentage of firms in the sample with incomplete probationary 
succession processes where the new CEO was ousted before he was granted the combined title or where the 
heir apparent left the firm before becoming the CEO as well as the exchanges the firms are listed on.  
Panels C and D present the origins of incoming CEOs and the future career choices of departing 
chairmen/CEOs, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing CEO and Chairman Age 203 60.46 8.27 35 56 63 65 78 
Departing CEO and Chairman Tenure 
as Chairman 
203 8.63 7.98 0.25 3 7 11 47 
Departing CEO and Chairman Tenure 
as CEO 
203 9.68 8.07 0.5 4 8 12 47 
Departing CEO and Chairman Prior 
Time with the Firm 
203 20.35 13.50 0.5 9 17.5 31.75 52 
Departing CEO and Chairman Share 
Ownership (%) 
203 4.91 9.81 <1 <1 1.35 4.23 62.1 
Incoming CEO Age 203 50.09 6.96 34 45 50 55 67 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
203 9.34 10.93 0 0.29 4 15.5 40 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
203 3.68 4.67 0 0 2 5 27 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 203 1.43 3.67 0 <1 <1 1.4 26 
Length of the Probationary Period 203 2.46 2.60 0.01 0.75 1.57 3.53 16.34 
Board Size 203 9.29 3.26 3 7 9 11 23 
Outside Board Members (%) 203 36.91 15.47 0 27.27 37.5 46.96 76.92 
Institutional Ownership (%) 203 32.86 12.5395 0.31 12.73 36.79 52.12 87.24 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 203 6.72 11.40 <1 <1 2.91 7.49 74.8 
Market Capitalization ($millions) 203 1586.14 5126 1.67 16.10 127.53 976.54 44183 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
New CEOs ousted after transition period 20 9.85 % 
Transition period ends with the death of the departing chairman 6 2.96 % 
Departing chairmen that are founders or members of the founding family 41 20.20 % 
Firm is listed on NYSE 106 52.22 % 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 88 43.35 % 
Firm is listed on AMEX 5 2.46 % 
 
Panel C: Incoming CEO Origin 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incoming CEO is an outsider 55 27.09 % 
Incoming CEO was President or Chief Operating Officer 111 54.68 % 
Incoming CEO was President or CEO of a subsidiary 10 4.93 % 
Incoming CEO was Executive/Senior VP or CFO 15 7.39 % 
Incoming CEO was outside director or consultant to the firm 8 3.94 % 
 
Panel D: Departing CEO and Chairman’s Future Career 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Departing chairmen that serve on other boards after retirement 87 42.86 % 
Departing chairman stays on the board as Chairman Emeritus 18 8.87 % 
Departing chairman stays on the board as a director 70 34.48 % 
Departing chairman stays on the board as chairman of the executive committee 11 5.42 % 
Departing chairman stays on the board as a consultant to the firm 4 1.97 % 
 
 
The average (median) age of the incoming CEOs is 50 (50), and with an average 
(median) of 9.43 (4) years spent previously with the company.  These incoming CEOs 
have previously served on the board of directors of the company on average (median) 
3.68 (2) years.  Though the average new CEO has 1.4 % share ownership in the company 
when he first assumes the CEO title, the median stock ownership of new CEOs is less 
than 1%.   
Of the 203 firms that prefer probationary succession processes, 55 (27.09%) 
choose their new CEOs from managers of other firms while eight (3.94%) name either 
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their chief consultant or one of the outside directors to be the new CEO and subsequently 
CEO and chairman of the board of directors.  There are three main paths to inside 
succession, however.  Out of the remaining 140 firms that promote managers from within 
the firm to the CEO position, 111 (54.68 % of the entire passing-the-baton sample, and 
79.29% of the firms that prefer inside successors) promote their presidents and/or chief 
operating officers to the CEO office.  Ten (4.93 % of the sample) new CEOs are previous 
heads, presidents or CEOs of the main subsidiaries of the firm, while 15 (7.39 %) are 
promoted from executive or senior vice presidents or CFOs.  This pattern also fits 
Vancil’s (1987) description of probationary succession processes where the departing 
CEO and chairman chooses an heir apparent, usually the President or COO of the firm, 
and relinquishes his CEO title to him. 
Most of the departing chairmen in my relay-race succession sample continue their 
professional careers after relinquishing managerial titles.  Almost half of the departing 
chairmen, 87 (42.86 %) to be exact, continue to serve as directors on the boards of other 
companies after retirement.  On the other hand, 18 (8.87 %) departing chairmen remain 
on the board of directors of their companies as chairmen emeriti, 70 (34.48%) remain to 
serve as directors on their own boards and 11 (5.42%) continue to be chairmen of the 
executive committee.  Similarly, 4 (1.97%) departing chairmen continue to serve their 
companies as consultants.  Of these departing CEOs, 41 (20.20%) are also founders of 
their firms or members of the founding family.  Since most departing chairmen continue 
their careers on either their own board or on the boards of directors of other corporations, 
incentives for managerial conformism exist in the sample.   
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The average (median) market capitalization of the firms that prefer relay-race type 
probationary succession processes is $1,586.14 million ($127.53 million).  The mean 
market capitalization is significantly greater than the median because of some large cap 
companies included in the sample.  Some of the largest firms in this sub-sample are 
Phillip-Morris with a market capitalization of $44,183 million and General Motors with a 
market capitalization of $21,202 million.  The sample includes 106 firms listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 88 firms listed on NASDAQ and five firms listed on 
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).  The average (median) number of directors that 
serve on the board of directors of firms choosing probationary succession processes is 
9.29 (9).  On average (median) 36.91 % (37.5%) of the directors are outsiders.   Members 
of the board except for the departing and incoming CEO own on average (median) 6.72 
% (2.91%) of the shares of the company.  Similarly, institutional ownership in the 
companies that utilize relay-race type succession processes is 32.86 % (36.79 %) on 
average (median).   
The average (median) length of the probationary period when the old and new 
CEOs serve together as chairman of the board and CEO, respectively, is 2.46 (1.57) 
years.  The maximum probationary period lasts over 16 years in Collagen Corp, where 
the departing CEO still continues to remain as chairman emeritus even after relinquishing 
both titles.  On the other hand, the shortest probationary period is less than a week in 
Indresco Inc where the departing CEO unexpectedly retired at the beginning of the 
probationary period, after announcing that he would remain as the chairman of the board 
for another two years, and relinquished his chairman title immediately after the CEO title. 
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According to Vancil (1987), one of the purposes of the probationary period is to 
enable the board to effectively oust any new CEOs that “drop-the-baton” or cannot 
perform satisfactorily.  In my sample, 20 firms (9.85 %) end up ousting their incoming 
CEOs, without passing them the baton.  Six succession processes (2.96%), on the other 
hand, are concluded with the death of the incumbent CEO/current chairman. 
5.2. Succession from Unitary Leadership to Unitary Leadership14 
The term, “unitary leadership firms”, in this dissertation, refers to those firms that 
have a single individual holding the combined CEO and chairman of the board title.  
There are 128 firms in my sample that have unitary leadership and decide to undergo a 
managerial change where the individual that holds the combined CEO/chairman title is 
replaced by another individual that holds the same combined title.  Table 5.4 presents the 
descriptive statistics and the succession details of these firms. 
The average retirement age for the departing CEO and chairmen in unitary 
leadership firms seems a little higher than firms using probationary succession processes.  
The incumbent chairman and CEO departs on average (median) at the age of 59.41 (62), 
after serving an average (median) of 7.13 (6) years as the CEO and chairman of the 
board.  On average (median) the departing CEO and chairmen have been employed by 
their companies 18.99 (16) years, and own on average 4.60 % of the firm’s stock upon 
retirement.  The median stock ownership by the departing CEO and chairmen is less than 
one percent, however.  The high averages are the result of 25 (19.53% of the sample) 
firms where the departing CEO and chairmen are founders or members of the founding 
family and therefore own sometimes even more than 50% of the stock of the company.  
                                                 
14 Due to data availability problems, the number of observations for each variable differs in all the 
subsamples except for the probationary succession sample. 
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For instance, Morris Dabah, son of Gitano Corp’s founder, owns 68.20% of the firm’s 
stock when he retired from his position as chairman of the board and CEO. 
The incoming CEO and chairmen of the board are on average (median) 52.93 (53) 
years old and have been employed by their companies on average 7.95 (3) years, having 
spent on average (median) 3.39 (1) of these years serving on the board of directors of 
their companies.  Incoming CEOs own on average (median) 4.33 % (less than 1%) of the 
stock of the company when they are first appointed as the new CEO and chairman of the 
board.  The difference between the mean and median is driven by two extreme cases, 
Marquest Medical Products, Inc and YES Clothing co, where the controlling 
shareholders, with 71.99 % and 91.01 % ownership respectively, become the new CEO 
and chairmen of the board. 
Only nine (7.03 %) out of the 128 unitary leadership successions are the result of 
forced departures of the incumbent CEO and chairman of the board.  On the other hand, 
eight (6.25 %) of the new CEOs have served as an interim CEO and chairman of the 
board before obtaining the permanent title.  Half of the firms in the sample are listed on 
NYSE, while 54 firms (42.19%) are listed on NASDAQ and 7 (5.47%) are listed on 
AMEX at the time of the managerial succession.  The average (median) size of these 
firms measured by their market capitalizations is $2,432.21 million ($134.60 million).  
The firm with the largest market capitalization is Exxon Corp with $77,591.44 million, 
creating the gap between the mean and the median market capitalization.    These firms 
have on average (median) 9.24 (8) directors on serving on their boards, and on average 
(median) 43.84% (42.86%) of these directors are outsiders.  The directors of the firm 
except for the CEO and chairman, own on average (median) 7.31% (1.80%) of the shares 
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in these firms.  Similarly, institutional investors own on average (median) 29.92% 
(29.05%) of the shares in unitary leadership firms that change their leader holding a 
combined CEO/chairman of the board title. 
 
Table 5.4 
Unitary to Unitary Succession 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of firms with unitary leadership structures who 
change their CEO and Chairman of the Board.  CEO ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing 
CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and Chairman share ownership and 
institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO and 
chairman and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the percentage of 
the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and the Chairman 
of the Board.  Board size is the number of directors that serve on the board of the firm.  The percentage of 
outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board of the firm that are not former 
employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  Sales and assets of the firms are 
also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents certain firm characteristics like the exchanges the 
firms are listed on, the number of new CEO/Chairman that served as interim office holders before being 
granted the permanent title, the number of founders and members of the founding family that are 
relinquishing their titles.  Panels C and D present the origins of incoming CEOs and the future career 
choices of departing chairmen/CEOs, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing CEO and Chairman Age 108 59.41 7.43 35 53 62 65 72 
Departing CEO and Chairman 
Tenure as CEO/Chairman 
102 7.13 5.96 0.08 3 6 10.75 33 
Departing CEO and Chairman Prior 
Time with the Firm 
103 18.99 13.08 0.08 8.5 16 28.5 48 
Departing CEO and Chairman Share 
Ownership (%) 
112 4.60 10.57 0 <1 <1 3.43 68.20 
Incoming CEO and Chairman Age 125 52.93 7.95 31 48 53 58 74 
Incoming CEO and Chairman Prior 
Time with the Firm 
121 7.95 10.29 0 0 3 13 38 
Incoming CEO and Chairman Prior 
Time as a director on the board 
120 3.39 4.84 0 0 1 4.25 22 
Incoming CEO and Chairman Share 
Ownership (%) 
126 4.33 12.39 0 <1 <1 1.92 91.01 
Board Size 127 9.24 3.91 4 6 8 12 24 
Outside Board Members (%) 127 43.84 17.31 0 33.33 42.86 57.14 85.71 
Institutional Ownership (%) 127 29.92 10.65 1.02 13.52 29.05 51.38 71.25 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 123 7.31 13.65 <1 <1 1.8 7.85 88.23 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 128 2432.21 8638 2.67 16.71 134.60 1398.62 77591.44 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Forced Departure 9 7.03% 
New CEO/Chairman has served as an interim office holder before obtaining the 
permanent title 
8 6.25% 
Departing chairmen that are founders or members of the founding family 25 19.53% 
Firm is listed on NYSE 64 50% 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 54 42.19% 
Firm is listed on AMEX 7 5.47% 
 
Panel C: Incoming CEO and Chairman’s Origin 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incoming CEO is an outsider 41 32.03% 
Incoming CEO was President or Chief Operating Officer 45 35.16% 
Incoming CEO was President or CEO of a subsidiary 5 3.91% 
Incoming CEO was Executive/Senior VP or CFO 8 6.25% 
Incoming CEO was outside director or consultant to the firm 23 17.97% 
Vice Chairman 4 3.13% 
Retired Chairman and CEO 2 1.56% 
 
Panel D: Departing CEO and Chairman’s Future Career 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Departing chairmen that serve on other boards after retirement 38 29.68% 
Departing chairman stays on the board as Chairman Emeritus 2 1.56% 
Departing chairman stays on the board as a director 51 39.84% 
Departing chairman stays on the board as chairman of the executive committee 4 3.13% 
Departing chairman stays on the board as a consultant to the firm 9 7.03% 
 
 
The path to becoming the CEO and chairman of the board of a unitary leadership 
firm seems more varied than the path to the top of a firm using probationary succession 
process.  Almost a third, 41 (32.03 %), of the new heads of unitary leadership firms are 
outsiders.  They hold the CEO or CEO and chairmen positions in other corporations. In 
terms of inside succession however, 45 (35.16 %) of new CEOs are previously presidents 
or chief operating officers (COOs), while 23 (17.97 %) are either outside directors or 
consultants to the firms.  Presidents or CEOs of the main subsidiaries of the firms (five 
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cases, 3.91 %), executive, senior vice presidents (8 cases, 6.25%) and vice chairmen (four 
cases, 3.13%) constitute other successors in unitary leadership firms.  In two cases 
(1.56%) the incoming CEO and chairmen are previously retired chairmen or CEOs of the 
firms who are asked to step in by the board of directors and take over following an 
unexpected or forced departure. 
The future career prospects of the departing chairmen and CEOs are also varied.  
Since the retirement age is higher in this sample of unitary leadership firms, the number 
of CEOs and chairmen that pursue further careers is also lower compared to the 
probationary succession sample.  Still, 38 (29.68 %) of departing heads serve on the 
boards of directors of other firms, while 51 (39.84%) continue to serve as directors in 
their own firms.  Two (1.56 %) of the departing CEO and chairmen stay on their own 
board as Chairmen Emeriti, and four (3.13%) remain as the chairmen of the executive 
committee.  Similarly, nine (7.03 %) departing chairmen and CEOs do not remain on the 
board of directors but continue to serve their companies as consultants. 
5.3. Succession from Dual Leadership to Dual Leadership 
Dual leadership firms have separate individuals holding the CEO and chairman of 
the board titles.  In my sample, there are 90 managerial turnover announcements by firms 
with dual leadership; 48 firms (53.33 %) announcing only a change of CEOs while the 
chairman of the board stays the same; (37.78 %) announcing only a change of chairmen 
while the CEO remains the same and eight firms (8.89 %) announce that they are 
changing both their CEOs and chairmen at the same time (See Table 5.5 Panel B).  Table 
5.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 90 dual leadership firms.  
Then, the different types of changes are analyzed in more detail. 
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Table 5.5 
Dual Leadership Firms 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of dual leadership firms that announce a managerial 
change between 1993 and 1995.  CEO and Chairman ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing 
CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and chairman share ownership and 
institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO or 
chairmen and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the percentage of 
the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and the Chairman 
of the Board.  The percentage of outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board 
of the firm that are not former employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  
Sales and assets of the firms are also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents the number of firms 
changing only their CEOs, those changing only their Chairmen and those changing both simultaneously as 
well as the exchanges the firms are listed on.   
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing CEO Age 90 53.36 7.86 36 48 53 58 72 
Departing CEO Tenure as CEO 90 4.55 4.47 0.5 1.88 3 5.5 25 
Departing CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
90 10.99 10.07 0.5 4 9 13 47 
Departing CEO Share Ownership (%) 90 1.98 3.34 <1 <1 0.89 2.36 20.80 
Incoming CEO Age 90 50.29 6.77 37 46 51 55 77 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
90 7.10 9.62 0 0.5 3 9 47 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
90 3.70 4.55 0 0 2 6 22 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 90 0.95 1.58 <1 <1 <1 1.55 5.80 
Departing Chairman Age 90 61.88 9.82 39 54 64 69 85 
Departing Chairman Tenure as 
Chairman 
90 8.46 8.17 0.5 3 6 10 38 
Departing Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
90 16.21 12.70 1 6 13 22 47 
Departing Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
90 7.70 12.77 <1 <1 1.88 9.65 57.94 
Incoming Chairman Age 90 59.59 8.83 40 53 60 67 76 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
90 11.72 11.11 0 3 9 15 47 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
90 11.25 11.13 0 3 8 14 47 
Incoming Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
90 5.87 11.45 <1 <1 1.20 5.03 57.94 
Board Size 90 8.02 2.67 3 6 7 9 18 
Outside Board Members (%) 90 31.41 13.05 0 22.92 33.33 40 58.33 
Institutional Ownership (%) 90 41.05 13.54 2.65 14.81 39.47 55.16 91.03 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 90 6.58 8.42 <1 1.47 3.60 8.29 51 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 90 435.24 967.45 0.35 19.05 70.39 325.74 5114.62 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Changing only their CEOs while the Chairman remains in office 34 37.78 % 
Changing only their Chairmen while the CEO remains in office 48 53.33 % 
Changing both their CEOs and Chairmen simultaneously 8 8.88 % 
Firm is listed on NYSE 35 38.88 % 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 42 46.67 % 
Firm is listed on AMEX 8 8.88 % 
 
The departing chairmen of the board are on average (median) 61.88 (64) years old 
with an average (median) of 8.46 (6) years of tenure as chairmen, and an average 
(median) of 16.21 (13) years of service to the firm as an employee.  Departing CEOs on 
the other hand, are on average (median) 53.36 (53) years old with an average (median) of 
4.55 (3) years of tenure as CEOs during their on average (median) 10.99 (9) years of time 
spent working for the firm.  Similarly, departing chairmen own on average (median) 
7.70% (1.88%) stock in the firm, whereas departing CEOs own only 1.98% (0.98%) on 
average (median).   
Incoming chairmen are on average (median) 59.59 (60) years old with an average 
(median) of 11.72 (9) years of service in the firm, on average (median) 11.25 (8) of those 
spent as directors in the board.  Incoming CEOs, meanwhile, are on average (median) 
50.29 (51) years old with an average (median) of 7.10 (3) years of service to the firm, on 
average (median) 3.70 (2) of those years spent of the board of directors.  Incoming 
chairmen own on average (median) 5.87% (1.20%) stock in the firm, while the incoming 
CEOs own on average (median) only 0.95% (less than 1%) of the shares of the firm. 
Firms with dual leadership structures that announce a managerial change have on 
average (median) 8.02 (7) directors on their board, an average (median) of 31.41% 
(33.33%) of whom are outsiders.  The directors on the board except for the incumbent 
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CEO and Chairman own on average (median) 6.58% (3.60%) of the equity in the firm, 
while institutional investors hold on average (median) 41.05% (39.47%) ownership in 
these firms.  
Dual leadership firms tend to be smaller in market capitalization compared to 
others.  The average (median) size of the dual leadership firms in my sample is $435.24 
million ($70.39 million) in terms of market capitalization.  Of the 90 dual leadership 
firms in my sample, 35 (38.88%) of these firms trade on the NYSE, while 42 (46.67%) 
trade on NASDAQ and 8 (8.88%) trade on AMEX.   
5.3.1. Dual Leadership Firms that Change Only Their CEOs While Their Chairmen 
Remain the Same 
 
There are 46 firms in my sample that have separate CEO and chairman of the 
board titles and between 1993 and 1995 announce that they are changing their CEOs, 
while their chairmen remain the same.  Two additional firms that do not have chairmen of 
the board are also included in this sample.  The highest office in the company is the CEO.  
Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics on these firms and the origins of their new 
CEOs as well as the future careers of their departing CEOs. 
The chairmen of these firms are on average (median) 61 (62.5) years old with an 
average (median) of 6.5 (4) year tenure as the chairmen of their firms.  During their 
average (median) 14.74 (11) years time spent in their companies, these chairmen have 
accumulated on average (median) 9.54% (2.41%) of the shares of the firm.  The 
maximum share ownership of 57.94 % of the stock of the firm belongs to 74-year old 
Leonard J. Bruce, who has been chairman of the board at Vallen Corporation for 34 years 
and has been with the company for over 47.  Except for this outlier, the maximum share 
ownership by chairmen is 25 %. 
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Table 5.6 
Dual to Dual Succession: Firms that Change Only Their CEOs 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the dual leadership sample that change only their CEOs while 
the chairman of the board stays in office.  CEO and chairman ages, prior time spent in the firm and the 
departing CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and Chairman share 
ownership and institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent 
CEO and chairman and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the 
percentage of the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and 
the Chairman of the Board.  Board size is the number of directors that serve on the board of the firm.  The 
percentage of outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board of the firm that are 
not former employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  Sales and assets of the 
firms are also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents certain firm characteristics like the 
exchanges the firms are listed on, the number of new CEO/Chairman that served as interim office holders 
before being granted the permanent title, the number of founders and members of the founding family that 
are relinquishing their titles.  Panels C and D present the origins of incoming CEOs and the future career 
choices of departing CEOs, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing CEO Age 42 54.88 9.10 36 48.25 55.5 61.75 72 
Departing CEO Tenure as CEO 41 5.34 5.13 1 2 4 6 25 
Departing CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
41 15.02 12.11 2 6 10 25 47 
Departing CEO Share Ownership (%) 46 1.82 3.49 <1 <1 0.22 2.27 20.80 
Incoming CEO Age 48 50.77 7.58 37 45 50.5 56 77 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
48 8.29 12.05 0 0 3 15 47 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
48 2.38 3.40 0 0 0.625 4 12 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 48 0.60 1.37 <1 <1 <1 0.05 5 
Chairman Age 46 61.04 9.44 40 54 62.5 69 76 
Chairman Tenure as Chairman 46 6.51 6.89 1 3 4 7.75 34 
Chairman Prior Time with the Firm 46 14.74 12.11 1 5.25 11 20.25 47 
Chairman Share ownership (%) 46 9.54 14.64 <1 <1 2.41 13.5 57.94 
Board Size 48 8 2.87 3 6 7 9 18 
Outside Board Members (%) 48 29.70 12.69 0 21.67 30.38 36.88 58.33 
Institutional Ownership (%) 48 39.87 11.24 2.65 11.37 37.12 51.76 78.16 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 48 7.45 10.62 <1 0.90 3.2 8.23 51 
Market Capitalization  ($ millions) 48 450.61 924.89 0.97 21.18 91.92 340.61 4200.43 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Forced Departure 3 6.25 % 
Firm has no chairman of the board; highest office is CEO 2 4.17 % 
Departing chairmen that are founders or members of the founding family 3 6.25 % 
Firm is listed on NYSE 19 39.58 % 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 20 41.67 % 
Firm is listed on AMEX 6 12.50 % 
 
Panel C: Incoming CEO’s Origin 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incoming CEO is an outsider 18 37.50 % 
Incoming CEO was President or Chief Operating Officer 13 27.08 % 
Incoming CEO was President or CEO of a subsidiary 4 8.33 % 
Incoming CEO was Executive/Senior VP or CFO 9 18.75 % 
Incoming CEO was outside director or consultant to the firm 4 8.33 % 
 
Panel D: Departing CEO’s Future Career 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Departing CEO stays on the board as a director 11 22.92 % 
Departing CEO becomes vice chairmen 4 8.33 % 
 
The departing CEOs of dual leadership firms that change only their CEOs are on 
average (median) 54.88 (55.5) years old with an average (median) of 15.02 (10) years of 
service to their companies, on average (median) 5.34 (4) years of which have been as the 
CEO.  Their average (median) stock ownership in the firm is 1.82 % (0.22 %), 
significantly lower than the ownership of the chairmen.  The maximum share ownership 
in departing CEOs is 20.80% of Zonic Corp’s shares owned by Gerald Zobrist.  Zonic 
Corp, however, is one of the two companies that do not have a chairman of the board, and 
the highest corporate office is the office of the chief executive officer.  Excluding that 
outlier, there are no companies in my sample with over 5% share ownership by their 
departing CEOs.  Of these departing CEOs, only four (8.33 %) become vice chairmen of 
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the board, later to succeed the current chairmen, whereas 11 (22.92 %) remain on the 
board as directors. 
Incoming CEOs, on the other hand, are on average (median) 50.77 (50.5) years 
old and have been with their companies on average (median) 8.29 (3) years, with an 
average (median) 2.38 (0.625) years of that time spent as directors.  Both the mean and 
median share ownership of the incoming CEOs is less than 1% of the shares of the firm.  
More than a third of the incoming CEOs are from other companies (18 cases, 37.50 %).  
On the other hand, 13 (27.08%) of the new CEOs were previously presidents or chief 
operating officers of their companies, and 9 (18.75%) have been executive or senior vice 
presidents.  Four (8.33%) of the incoming CEOs were heads of a subsidiary and another 4 
(8.33%) were outside directors or consultants to their firms. 
The boards of directors in these firms are made up of an average (median) of 8 (7) 
members, on average (median) 29.70 % (30.38%) of whom are outsiders.  The members 
of the board except for the chairman and the CEO, own on average (median) 7.45% 
(3.2%) of the stock of the firm, whereas institutional investors own on average (median) 
39.87% (37.12%) of the shares in these firms.  Only 2 of the departing CEOs have been 
forced to leave, and only 3 of the departing CEOs are founders of the firms or members 
of the founding family.   
The average (median) size of the dual leadership firms that change only their 
CEOs while their chairmen remain the same is $ 450.61 million ($91.92 million).  Of the 
48 dual leadership firms changing only their CEOs, 19 (39.58 %) trade on the NYSE, 
while 20 (41.67 %) and 6 (12.50 %) trade on NASDAQ and the AMEX, respectively. 
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5.3.2. Dual Leadership Firms that Change Only Their Chairmen While Their CEOs 
Remain the Same 
 
In my sample there are 34 dual leadership firms that change only their chairmen 
while their CEOs remain in office.  Table 5.7 presents the descriptive statistics and the 
succession details on these firms.  The CEOs of these firms are on average (median) 
50.47 (51) years old and have an average (median) tenure of 2.99 (1.88) years as the CEO 
of their respective firms.  They have been with their firms on average (median) 6.18 (4.5) 
years and own on average (median) 1.55 % (0.95 %) of their company’s stock.  The 
CEOs in this sub-sample have significantly less tenure than their counterparts in the firms 
engaging in other types of succession processes presented above.  However, this is 
mainly because the tenure of the CEOs in this sample remains yet to be concluded.   
The departing chairmen are on average (median) 62.16 (64) years old and have 
served their corporations for an average (median) of 18.03 (13) years, an average 
(median) 11.15 (8) years of which as chairmen of the board of directors.  They own on 
average (median) 6.27 % (1.4%) of their companies’ stock.  The oldest chairman to leave 
his office during this time period is 85-years-old Frank Stanton of Broadcast International 
Inc, and was replaced by the 69 years-old consultant to the company, Howard G. Haas.  
The CEO of Broadcast International during this time and for another five  years after the 
chairman succession was the 39-years-old Dwight G. Egan.  Similarly, J.B Hunt, the 
founder of J.B. Hunt Transportation Services owned 39.9 % of the stock of his company 
when he retired at the age of 68 to be replaced by the 42 years-old Wayne Garrison, who 
had been with the company for over 22 years.  Except for J.B. Hunt, the maximum share 
ownership by a departing chairman was 12.52 %. 
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Table 5.7 
Dual to Dual Succession: Firms that Change Only Their Chairmen 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the dual leadership sample that change only their chairmen 
while the CEO stays in office.  CEO and chairman ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing CEO 
tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and Chairman share ownership and 
institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO and 
chairman and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the percentage of 
the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming chairman of the board 
and the CEO.  Board size is the number of directors that serve on the board of the firm.  The percentage of 
outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board of the firm that are not former 
employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  Sales and assets of the firms are 
also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents certain firm characteristics like the exchanges the 
firms are listed on, the number of founders and members of the founding family that are relinquishing their 
titles.  Panels C and D present the origins of incoming chairmen and the future career choices of departing 
chairmen, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing Chairman Age 31 62.16 11.11 39 54 64 69.5 85 
Departing Chairman Tenure as 
Chairman 
31 11.15 9.74 0.5 4 8 14.5 38 
Departing Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
31 18.03 12.96 2 6.5 13 25.5 46 
Departing Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
32 6.27 10.87 <1 <1 1.4 5.27 39.9 
Incoming Chairman Age 34 58.71 8.25 42 51.25 58.5 64.5 76 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
34 8.06 9.58 0 2 4 10.75 38 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
34 7.09 9.25 0 1.25 3 9.75 38 
Incoming Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
34 0.98 1.76 <1 <1 <1 1.45 6.15 
CEO Age 34 50.47 5.41 39 47 51 55 60 
CEO Tenure as CEO 34 2.99 2.82 0.5 1 1.88 4 11 
CEO Prior Time with the Firm 34 6.18 5.28 0.5 2.25 4.5 9 22 
CEO Share ownership (%) 34 1.55 1.80 <1 <1 0.94 2.3 5.8 
Board Size 34 8.15 2.34 5 6 8 9.75 14 
Outside Board Members (%) 34 33.33 13.02 0 24.73 33.33 42.86 54.55 
Institutional Ownership (%) 34 40.78 12.57 3.29 16.57 38.91 58.39 87.45 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 34 5.86 4.96 <1 2.52 4.86 8.54 19.84 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 34 295.68 748.78 0.35 18.10 48.12 253.23 4287.65 
 
Panel B: Succession Details 
 Number % of Sample 
Forced Departure 2 5.88 % 
Succession is the result of the death of the departing chairman 3 8.82 % 
Departing chairmen that are founders or members of the founding family 8 23.53 % 
Firm is listed on NYSE 13 38.24 % 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 17 50.00 % 
Firm is listed on AMEX 2 5.88 % 
(table continued) 
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Panel C: Incoming Chairmen’s Origin 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incoming Chairman is an outsider 1 2.94 % 
Incoming Chairman was President or Chairman of a subsidiary 1 2.94 % 
Incoming Chairman was Executive/Senior VP or CFO 5 14.71 % 
Incoming Chairman was outside director or consultant to the firm 25 73.53 % 
 
Panel D: Departing Chairmen’s Future Career 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Departing chairmen that serve on other boards after retirement 11 32.35 % 
Departing chairman stays on the board as Chairman Emeritus 4 11.76 % 
Departing Chairman stays on the board as a director 10 29.41 % 
 
Incoming chairmen, on the other hand, are on average (median) 58.71 (58.5) years 
old with on average (median) 8.06 (4) years of prior time in the company, on average 
(median) 7.09 (3) years of which are as directors on the board.  The incoming chairmen 
own, on both average and median, less than 1% stock ownership in the firms.   Most of 
the incoming chairmen have long experiences on boards; 25 out of the 34 in this sample 
(73.53%) were either outside directors with a long tenure on the board of the company or 
long-time consultants to the firm.  Apart from these, there was only one case where the 
new chairmen was a complete outsider, having never served on the board of the company 
before.  Five (14.71 %) of the incoming chairmen were previously senior or executive 
vice presidents or CFOs, and one (2.94 %) was the CEO of a subsidiary of the firm. 
Most of the departing chairmen seem to stay on the boards of their own company 
or other companies after retirement.  Of the 34 cases in my sub-sample, 11 (32.35%) 
departing chairmen continue their careers as directors on the boards of other companies, 
while 10 (29.41 %) remain on the boards of their own companies as director.  Meanwhile, 
4 (11.76 %) departing chairmen continue their services to their company as Chairmen 
Emeriti. 
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The boards of directors of dual leadership firms that change only their chairmen 
have an average (median) of 8.15 (8) members on their boards and a third (both on 
average and median) of these directors are outsiders.  The size of the board and the 
percentage of outsiders is similar to the general dual leadership firm in this sample as 
well as to those that change only their CEOs.  The members of the board that are not 
chairmen or CEOs, own on average (median) 5.86 % (4.86 %) of the shares of the 
company.  The median board share ownership in dual leadership firms that change their 
CEOs are significantly higher than the board ownership in other dual leadership firms.  
This may imply that it takes a higher level of stock based incentives for board members 
to act in the interests of shareholders and not under the influence of the chairmen or the 
CEO.  Additionally, literature suggests that around at least 5% ownership is required to 
properly align the incentives of managers and shareholders and solve the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) agency problem implicitly. 
Moreover, firms that have dual leadership structures seem to experience a more 
rapid turnover in CEOs compared to chairmen.  The firms that change their CEOs and 
those that change their chairmen are very similar in my sample.  However, the average 
CEO turnover in these firms seems to be twice as much.  Both the average and the 
median tenure of departing chairmen are twice as much as those of departing CEOs.  
Similarly, departing chairmen own significantly more stock in their firms than departing 
CEOs do.  This indicates that departing chairmen may be more entrenched to their firms 
than CEOs would be. 
There are only two cases (5.88 %) of forced departure of chairmen in my sample 
of dual leadership firms that change only their chairmen, and only three cases (8.82 %) 
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where succession was the result of the death of the former chairman.  Eight departing 
chairmen (23.53 %) are founders or members of the founding families of these firms.   
The mean (median) size of the firms in this sample is $ 295.68 million ($48.12 
million), and the distribution between the exchanges for the firms in this sub-sample are 
as follows: 13 (38.24 %) trade on the NYSE, while half (17 firms) trade on NASDAQ 
and 2 (5.88 %) trade on the AMEX.  Institutional ownership in these firms is on average 
(median) 40.78 % (38.91%). 
 
5.3.3. Dual Leadership Firms that Change Both Their CEOs and Chairmen of the 
Board at the Same Time 
 
There are only 8 firms in my sample that have dual leadership structures, in other 
words, have separate individuals holding the Chairman of the board and CEO titles, and 
that change both of these individuals simultaneously (Table 5.8).  However, 6 (75%) of 
these cases are actually passing-the-baton type cases.  In these cases, the incumbent 
Chairman of the board leaves his chair to the current CEO of the firm, while the 
incumbent CEO resigns his post to his heir apparent, usually the president or COO of the 
company, to take the Chairman position.  These processes are very similar to 
probationary succession processes following a relay-race style procedure.  However, 
none of the individual managers obtain a combined CEO and Chairman of the board title 
at any point of their career.   
Though with a small sample size like 8, it is very difficult to make statistically 
significant statements, the age and tenure characteristics of the departing chairmen in 
these firms are very similar to the firms in my probationary succession process sub-
sample.  The departing chairmen in this sample are on average (median) 62.63 (66.5) 
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years old, with an average (median) tenure of 9.25 (9.50) years as chairmen and an 
average (median) of 17.63 (12.5) years as employees of the firms they are leaving.  They 
own on average (median) 2.89% (0.75%) of the shares in the firms they are retiring from. 
The minimum age for a departing chairman is 56, George A Castrucci of Baldwin Piano 
and Organ Co., suggesting that these departing chairmen are mostly at their retiring age 
and are passing-the-baton to their CEOs.  These characteristics are consistent with 
Vancil’s (1987) description of relay-race type succession processes. Out of the 8 
departing chairmen 3 (37.50%) remain on the board of their companies as directors, 
while another 3 (37.50%) remain as Chairmen Emeriti.  Thus, most of the incentive 
conflicts that exist in probationary processes also exist for these firms. 
The incoming chairmen are on average (median) 55 (56) years old, and have an 
average (median) of 9.88 (10) years of experience in the company, on average (median) 
8.88 (8) years of which has been as directors on the boards of their firms.  These 
incoming chairmen own on average (median) 5.55% (3.45%) stock in their firms.   
Six out of these 8 incoming chairmen are departing CEOs of their firms.  
Therefore, the descriptive statistics of departing CEOs are very similar to those of 
incoming chairmen.  The departing CEOs in these firms are on average (median) 57.63 
(57) years old, with an average (median) tenure of 7.13 (6) years as CEOs of their firms, 
and an average (median) of 10.75 (10.5) years of prior service to the company.  The 
departing CEOs hold on average (median) 4.67% (2.55%) stock ownership in their firms. 
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Table 5.8 
Dual Leadership Firms: Firms that Change Both Their Chairmen and CEOs 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of dual leadership firms that announce a managerial 
change between 1993 and 1995.  CEO and Chairman ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing 
CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and chairman share ownership and 
institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO or 
chairmen and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the percentage of 
the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and the Chairman 
of the Board.  The percentage of outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board 
of the firm that are not former employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  
Sales and assets of the firms are also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents the number of firms 
changing only their CEOs, those changing only their Chairmen and those changing both simultaneously as 
well as the exchanges the firms are listed on.   
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing Chairman Age 8 65.63 5.93 56 62.25 66.5 69.25 74 
Departing Chairman Tenure as Chairman 8 9.25 5.50 1 6.25 9.5 12.25 18 
Departing Chairman Prior Time with the 
Firm 
8 17.63 15.57 2 7.75 12.5 23.75 42 
Departing Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
8 2.89 4.59 <1 <1 0.75 3.23 12.7 
Incoming Chairman Age 8 55 5.86 46 51.75 56 58.25 62 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time with the 
Firm 
8 9.88 5.54 0 7 10 13 17 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
8 8.88 4.96 0 7 8 12 17 
Incoming Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
8 5.55 5.67 <1 1.80 3.45 8.00 16.5 
Departing CEO Age 8 57.63 5.80 48 54.5 57 62.5 65 
Departing CEO Tenure as CEO 8 7.13 4.85 2 4.25 6 9 16 
Departing CEO Prior Time with the Firm 8 10.75 3.54 7 7.75 10.5 12.75 16 
Departing CEO Share Ownership (%) 8 4.67 5.95 <1 0.68 2.55 5.67 16.5 
Incoming CEO Age 8 46.14 6.31 38 42 47 49.5 55 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the Firm 8 3.36 5.85 0 0 1 3.25 16 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a director 
on the board 
8 0.71 0.95 0 0 0 1.5 2 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 8 0.58 1.09 <1 <1 <1 0.48 2.9 
Board Size 8 7.63 2.97 4 5.75 7 9 12 
Outside Board Members (%) 8 35.80 16.23 0 32.14 40.83 44.64 50 
Institutional Ownership (%) 8 40.55 12.37 2.89 15.21 39.12 56.41 91.03 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 8 4.49 3.89 <1 1.54 3.70 7.90 10 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 8 936.16 1769.27 0.67 34.57 73.13 876.43 5114.62 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Passing-the-baton type succession processes 6 75% 
Departing chairman is the founder or member of the founding family 1 12.50% 
Firm is listed on NYSE 3 37.50% 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 5 62.50% 
Firm is listed on AMEX 0 0 
 
Panel C: Incoming CEO’s Origin 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incoming Chairman is an outsider 3 37.50% 
Incoming Chairman was COO 1 12.50% 
Incoming Chairman was Executive/Senior VP or CFO 3 37.50% 
Incoming Chairman was outside director or consultant to the firm 1 12.50% 
 
Panel D: Departing Chairmen’s Future Career 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Departing chairman stays on the board as Chairman Emeritus 3 37.50% 
Departing Chairman stays on the board as a director 3 37.50 % 
Steps down to be vice-chairman 1 12.50% 
 
Incoming CEOs, on the other hand, are on average (median) 46.14 (47) years old.  
They have an average (median) of only 3.36 (1) years of experience in the company, and 
more than half have never served on the boards of their corporations. They own less than 
1% stock in the firms both on average and median.  Three (37.50%) out of the 8 
incoming CEOs in this sample are outsiders, while another 3 (37.50%) are promoted 
from executive vice presidents, and one (12.50%) new CEO is the incumbent COO of the 
firm. 
Dual leadership firms that simultaneously change both the CEOs and their 
Chairmen have average (median) market capitalizations of $ 936.16 million ($73.13 
million).  Three out of the 8 firms (37.50%) trade on the NYSE while 5 (62.50%) trade 
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on NASDAQ.  There are on average (median) 7.63 (7) people on the board of directors in 
these firms and on average (median) 35.80% (40.83%) of the directors are outsiders.  
Directors except the incumbent Chairmen and CEOs own on average (median) 4.49 % 
(3.70%) stock in these firms while institutional investors own on average (median) 
40.55% (39.12%).   
5.4. Firms that Move from Unitary to Dual Leadership Structures: Separation of 
Chairman of the Board and CEO Titles 
 
There are 38 firms in my sample that have unitary leadership structures, but 
decide to separate their Chairman of the board and CEO titles.  Table 5.9 presents the 
descriptive statistics on these companies as well as the details of their succession 
processes.  Seventeen (44.74%) of these cases are incomplete passing-the-baton cases, 
where the individual holding the combined CEO/Chairman of the board title relinquishes 
his CEO title to the heir apparent, and stays on as the chairman of the board.  Normally, 
after a probationary period, during which the departing CEO, incumbent chairman, and 
the new CEO serve the company together, the new CEO gets awarded the combined title 
of CEO and Chairman of the board. At this point, the old chairman leaves the chairman 
position to pursue his career.  In these incomplete passing-the-baton cases, however, the 
probationary period is still in progress at the end of year 2002.  Therefore, the companies 
have separate Chairman and CEOs.  Since there is no way to tell when the probationary 
period will end, and whether the new CEO will be awarded the combined title, I have 
classified these cases under separation of titles.   Furthermore, in most of these cases, the 
probationary periods are at least 6 to 7 years, (significantly lager than the average of 2.46 
years in probationary succession processes, with a t-statistic of 3.15 and a p-
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value<0.0001), which shows that these firms are effectively run with dual leaders for s 
significant amount of time to be treated separately from probationary processes. 
 
Table 5.9 
Separation of Titles: Firms that Move from Unitary to Dual Leadership 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of dual leadership firms that announce a managerial 
change between 1993 and 1995.  CEO and Chairman ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing 
CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and chairman share ownership and 
institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO or 
chairmen and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the percentage of 
the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and the Chairman 
of the Board.  The percentage of outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board 
of the firm that are not former employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  
Sales and assets of the firms are also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents the number of firms 
changing only their CEOs, those changing only their Chairmen and those changing both simultaneously as 
well as the exchanges the firms are listed on.   
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing Chairman and CEO Age 38 58.64 9.65 42 50 62 65 76 
Departing Chairman and CEO Tenure 
as Chairman 
38 9.56 9.56 1 3 6.5 11.75 39 
Departing Chairman and CEO Tenure 
as CEO 
38 12.85 10.45 1 4 10 20 39 
Departing Chairman and CEO Prior 
Time with the Firm 
38 17.74 12.52 3 8 13.5 28.75 45 
Departing Chairman and CEO Share 
Ownership (%) 
38 9.10 10.62 <1 1.44 4.20 12.95 33.60 
Incoming Chairman Age 38 58.14 9.78 40 51 60 65 76 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
38 16.95 13.60 0 7 11.5 26.75 45 
Incoming Chairman Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
38 14.79 12.26 0 5.5 11 23.5 41 
Incoming Chairman Share Ownership 
(%) 
38 10.26 15.48 <1 <1 3.48 13.23 71.70 
Incoming CEO Age 38 49.70 6.91 37 46 50 54 66 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
38 6.83 8.38 0 0.25 3.5 10 31 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a 
director on the board 
38 4.09 6.21 0 0 2 4.75 31 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 38 1.93 4.52 0 <1 <1 1.92 24.80 
Board Size 38 8 2.60 3 6 8 9 14 
Outside Board Members (%) 38 28.78 11.92 0 20.56 28.57 37.50 57.14 
Institutional Ownership (%) 38 32.59 13.72 0.94 12.51 33.28 51.37 76.27 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 38 7.50 8.25 <1 2.68 5.77 9.39 36.60 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 38 293.91 544.27 1.08 30.97 91.71 375.12 2988.75 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incomplete Passing-the-baton type successions 17 44.74% 
Changes only their CEO 19 50.00% 
Changes only their chairmen 2 5.26% 
Changes both the chairman and the CEO at the same time 18 47.37% 
Departing chairman or CEO is the founder or member of the founding family 13 34.21% 
Firm is listed on NYSE 15 39.47% 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 16 42.11% 
Firm is listed on AMEX 6 15.79% 
 
Panel C: Incoming Chairman or CEO’s Origin 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incoming Chairman is an outsider 6 15.79% 
Incoming CEO is an outsider 10 26.32% 
Incoming CEO is the president or COO of the company 17 44.74% 
 
The mean (median) age of departing chairmen and CEOs in this sample is 58.64 
(62).  The departing chairmen and CEOs have served on average (median) 9.56 (6.5) 
years as chairmen and 12.85 (10) years as CEOs of their companies.  They have been 
employed by their companies on average (median) 17.74 (13.5) years when they leave 
their positions, and own on average (median) 9.10% (12.95%) stock in their firms.  The 
youngest chairmen and CEO to leave his position is 42-years-old Oliver Richard III, who 
left New Jersey Resources as chairman and CEO to take a similar position in Columbia 
Gas Co.  He was replaced as chairman of the board by one of the outside directors of the 
company, Bruce G. Coe, and as CEO by Lawrence M Downes, the senior vice president 
and Chief Financial Officer of the company.   
The incoming chairmen are on average (median) 58.14 (60) years old and have 
been with the company on average (median) 16.95 (11.5) years, an average (median) of 
14.79 (11) of which have been as directors on the board.  The incoming chairmen own on 
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average (median) 10.26% (3.48%) stock in the firms.  The high average stock ownership 
is the result of 71.70% stock ownership of Sam Zell, who steps up as the chairman of 
Carter Hawley Hale Stores after the founder and 17-years-long chairman, Phillip P. 
Hawley retires.  Sam Zell’s personal fund owns 71.70% of the shares in Carter Hawley 
Hale Stores, and as the controlling shareholder, he took the chairman position after the 
retirement of the founder. 
Meanwhile, incoming CEOs are on average (median) 49.70 (50) years old and 
have served an average (median) of 6.83 (3.5) years in their companies, and average 
(median) of 4.09 (2) years of which are as directors on the board.  The equity ownership 
of incoming CEOs is on average 1.93% and the median is less than 1 %. 
Of the 38 firms that separate their chairman on the board and CEO titles, 19 
(50%) do so by changing only their CEO and keeping their chairman in position, whereas 
only 2 (5.26%) change only their chairman, keeping their CEO in position.  The 
remaining 18 firms (47.37%) separate their titles when the executive holding the 
combined CEO/Chairman of the board title leaves and is replaced by two separate 
individuals for the respective positions.   
Separation of titles seems to be prevalent when members of the founding family 
leave governing positions in the firms to non-family members.  In 13 (34.21%) of the 
cases in my sample, the departing CEO and Chairman is either the founder of the firm or 
a member of the founding family. 
The origins of the newcomers in title separations are not as varied as other forms 
of succession.  In 17 cases out of 38 (44.74%), the new CEO is either the president or the 
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chief operating officer (COO) of the firm.  In another 10 cases, the new CEO is an 
outsider and in 6 cases, the incoming chairman is an outsider as well. 
The firms in this sub-sample that move from unitary to dual leadership structures 
have on average (median) $293.91 million ($91.71 million) of size in market 
capitalization.  Their average (median) board size is 8 (8) directors, 28.78% (28.57%) of 
which are outside directors on average (median).  Stock ownership of board members 
other than the CEO or the chairman is 7.50% (5.77%) on average (median), while 
institutional ownership of equity in these firms is on average (median) 32.59% (33.28%).  
Of the 38 firms included 15 (39.47%) trade on the NYSE, while 16 (42.11%) and 6 
(15.79%) trade on NASDAQ and AMEX respectively. 
5.5. Firms that Move from Dual to Unitary Leadership Structures: Unification of 
Chairman of the Board and CEO Titles 
 
My sample of managerial successions between years 1993 and 1995 includes 14 
cases where dual leadership firms have combined their CEO and chairman of the board 
titles.  Table 5.10 presents the descriptive statistics and succession details on these cases.  
In 6 of these cases (42.86% of the sample) the incumbent chairman takes on the title of 
CEO as well, after the current CEO leaves the firm, while in another 4 cases (28.57%) the 
reverse happens and the CEO takes over the chairman office as well.  In the remaining 4 
cases (28.57%) both the CEO and the chairman are replaces by a third party holding the 
combined title. 
The departing chairmen in this sample are on average (median) 56.54 (61) years 
old and have an average (median) tenure of 7.33 (5) years as chairmen of their boards.  
They have been employees of their firms on average (median) 14.38 (11) years and hold 
on average (median) 5.04% (2.70%) stock ownership in the firm. 
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Table 5.10 
Unification of Titles: Firms that Move from Dual to Unitary Leadership 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of dual leadership firms that announce a managerial 
change between 1993 and 1995.  CEO and Chairman ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing 
CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of years.  Departing CEO and chairman share ownership and 
institutional ownership measure the percentage of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO or 
chairmen and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock ownership measures the percentage of 
the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing and/or incoming CEO and the Chairman 
of the Board.  The percentage of outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board 
of the firm that are not former employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  
Sales and assets of the firms are also presented in millions of dollars.  Panel B presents the number of firms 
changing only their CEOs, those changing only their Chairmen and those changing both simultaneously as 
well as the exchanges the firms are listed on.   
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Departing Chairman Age 8 56.54 8.13 44 49 61 63 66 
Departing Chairman Tenure as 
Chairman 
8 7.33 6.26 2 3 5 8 21 
Departing Chairman Prior Time with 
the Firm 
8 14.38 12.76 3 5 11 21 43 
Departing Chairman Share 
Ownership (%) 
8 5.04 6.49 <1 1.00 2.70 7.38 23.30 
Departing CEO Age 10 49.92 8.99 36 43.75 50 53.25 67 
Departing CEO Tenure as CEO 10 6.68 5.24 2 3 5 8.25 18 
Departing CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
10 12.04 9.59 3 5.75 7.25 15 31 
Departing CEO Share Ownership (%) 10 4.35 6.19 <1 <1 1.90 5.50 22.30 
Incoming Chairman and CEO Age 14 50.36 6.88 36 46.5 51 53.5 63 
Incoming Chairman and CEO Prior 
Time with the Firm 
14 9.78 8.55 0 4 7 13.25 30 
Incoming Chairman and CEO Prior 
Time as a director on the board 
14 9.21 8.27 0 4 6.5 13.5 28 
Incoming Chairman and CEO Share 
Ownership (%) 
14 6.30 7.66 0 0.25 4.65 8.10 23.30 
Board Size 14 8.29 2.58 5 6.5 8 8.75 14 
Outside Board Members (%) 14 34.31 16.48 12.50 23.56 33.33 39.38 71.43 
Institutional Ownership (%) 14 31.52 14.38 2.11 12.67 32.41 53.19 78.34 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 14 7.64 9.00 <1 2.13 4.40 11.10 31.80 
Market Capitalization ($ millions) 14 2347.96 5199.49 1.13 23.22 65.21 856.57 14635.31 
(table continued) 
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Panel B: Succession Details 
 
 Number % of Sample 
Incumbent Chairman takes over the CEO office as well 6 42.86% 
Incumbent CEO takes over the Chairman office as well 4 28.57% 
Both the CEO and the Chairman are replaced by a third party holding the 
combined title 
4 28.57% 
Departing chairman or CEO is the founder or member of the founding family 2 14.29% 
Incoming Chairman and CEO is the founder or member of the founding family 4 28.57% 
Departing Chairman or CEO remains on the board 4 28.57% 
Firm is listed on NYSE 6 42.86% 
Firm is listed on NASDAQ 8 57.14% 
Firm is listed on AMEX 0 0% 
 
The departing CEOs, on the other hand, are on average (median) 49.92 (50) years 
old with an average (median) tenure of 6.68 (5) years as CEOs of the firm and average 
(median) of 12.04 (7.25) years of work experience in the company.  Their stock holdings 
are on average (median) 4.35% (1.90%).   
The incoming CEO and chairman that will hold the new combined title have an 
average (median) age of 50.36 (51).  They have been on the boards of these companies on 
average (median) 9.21 (6.5) years and have further been employees of the firm for an 
average (median) of 9.78 (7) years.  They own on average (median) 6.30% (4.65%) stock 
in the firm. 
Except for Oracle Corp, with its $14,635.31 million market capitalization, most of 
the firms in this sub-sample are relatively small, with a median market capitalization of 
$65.21 million.  They have on average (median) 8.29 (8) directors on their board, on 
average (median) 34.21% (33.33%) of which are outsiders.  Institutional investors hold 
on average (median) 31.52% (32.41%) of stock ownership in these firms, while the board 
of directors except for the incumbent CEO and Chairman holds on average (median) 
7.64% (4.40%) of the firm’s stock.  Six out of the 14 (42.86%) firms in this sample trade 
on NYSE, while the remaining 8 (44.44%) trade on NASDAQ. 
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There are only 2 cases (14.29%) where the departing CEO or chairmen is the 
founder of the firm or a member of the founding family.  However, there are 4 cases 
(28.57%) where the incoming CEO or chairman is a founder or member of the founding 
family.  These seem like cases where the founders feel the need to come back and take 
control of their companies after they have been away for a while.  Similarly, in 4 cases 
(28.57%), the departing CEO or chairman remains on the board as a director. 
The overall descriptive statistics of the sample support the findings in Brickley, 
Coles and Jarrell (1997).  The departing CEOs of firms with dual leadership on average 
tend to be younger with shorter tenures and lower percentages of share ownership.  The 
average descriptive statistics of the probationary succession sample are very similar to the 
overall sample.  The average age of a departing chairman, for instance, in the overall 
sample is 60.21 while this number is 60.46 in the probationary succession sample.  The 
average tenure and stock ownership of the departing and incoming CEOs of the firms 
following probationary succession processes is also similar to the overall sample.  This 
supports Vancil’s (1987) argument that probationary succession processes are the 
common means of managerial succession for U.S. firms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DOES MANAGERIAL CONFORMISM EXIST? UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS 
 
This chapter provides univariate test results on the operating performance and 
other characteristics of the companies that go through probationary succession processes 
and tries to see whether there is evidence of managerial conformism in these firms.  It 
also tries to answer the question whether managerial conformism is detrimental to all 
firms. 
6.1. Existence of Managerial Conformism and Agency Costs During the 
Probationary Period 
 
Consistent with my hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2) stated in Chapter 3, if 
managerial conformism exists in firms with probationary succession processes, then there 
should be no significant change in the operating performance of the firm during the 
probationary period when the former CEO (current chairman) and the new CEO serve 
together.  However, when the probationary period is over and the new CEO gets awarded 
the combined title of CEO and chairman of the board, I expect operating performance of 
these firms to increase significantly.  Since the market would be able to foresee these 
effects, I expect a similar reaction in the stock returns of the firms.   
Table 6.1 presents the operating performance of the firms in my sample during the 
time of the former CEO, during the probationary transition period and after the new CEO 
has obtained the chairman title as well.  Three year time periods are used as the basis for 
comparison following Gabarro (1987) and Khurana and Nohria (2001).  The changes 
between each period have been measured.  I use return on assets (ROA) and industry 
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adjusted ROA (IAROA) to measure operating performance in this table,15  following 
Baliga et al (1996) and Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999).  Return on assets is the average 
[median] return on assets over these periods, calculated as the net income divided by 
average assets.  Following Parrino (1997) and Naveen (2003), industry adjusted return on 
assets have been defined as the average [median] annual returns on assets net of the 
industry mean, where the industry is determined according to two-digit SIC codes.16  I 
also use the Barber and Lyon (1997) criteria to create matched samples of firms, and 
report both results in separate panels. 
Results presented in all three panels of Table 6.1 are consistent with expectations.  
Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2), there are no significant changes in the 
accounting performance of the firms during the probationary period.  However, after the 
completion of the probationary period, when the new CEO obtains the combined title, 
there is a significant increase in the operating performance of the firms using 
probationary succession processes.  The average annual return on assets of the 183 firms 
that successfully complete their probationary succession processes increase by 1.93% (t-
statistic = 2.97), while the average annual industry adjusted and matched sample ROAs 
increase by 1.26% and 1.37% respectively (with t-statistics of 2.85 and 2.91 
respectively).    The results are the same using medians as well. 
 
                                                 
15 Other measures of operating performance, like return on capital following (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 
(1997), return on equity (ROE) and return on investment (ROI) have been considered.  However, statistical 
tests have revealed qualitatively the same results using all four measurements, therefore only ROAs have 
been reported.   
16 The industry-adjusted operating performance and market reaction variables are also calculated using 
four-digit SIC codes and the results are similar.  Therefore, to be consistent with previous literature, two-
digit SIC code based results are reported. 
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Table 6.1 
Accounting Operating Performance of Firms with Probationary Successions 
 
Operating performance is measured by Return on Assets, Industry Adjusted ROA and matched sample 
ROA.  Former CEO refers to the last three years of the former CEO’s tenure before the succession took 
place.  Probationary period refers to the transition period when the former CEO/current Chairman worked 
together with the new CEO, and the combined period refers to the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure 
after he obtains the combined CEO and Chairman of the Board title.  ΔF presents the mean[median] 
difference between the ROA and the IAROA before the former CEO steps down and the transition period, 
and ΔC refers to the mean[median] difference in operating performance after the new CEO gets the 
combined title.  ROA is calculated as the average[median] return on assets over the respective periods, 
while the industry adjusted ROA is the average[median] annual ROA net of industry mean, using two digit 
SIC codes to determine industry.  Results for both the sample of successful successions and the ones where 
the new CEO is ousted before he can obtain the combined title are presented separately.  Panel A presents 
the ROA, while Panel B presents the industry adjusted ROA.  In Panel C, matched sample results are 
displayed using the Barber and Lyon (1997) method to match firms. The results for medians and the sign-
rank test p-values on the differences are presented in brackets.  *, ** and *** represents significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Return on Assets 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank  
p-value] 
ΔC t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank  
p-value] 
Successful 
(N = 183) 
3.42 
[4.25] 
3.09 
[3.97] 
5.02 
[6.18] 
-0.33 
[-0.28] 
-1.52 (0.1183) 
[0.1457] 
1.93*** 
[2.21***] 
2.97 (0.0000) 
[0.0000] 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 
2.76 
[3.06] 
1.82 
[1.57]  
-0.94 
[-1.49*] 
-1.49 (0.1201) 
[0.0814]   
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry Adjusted Return on Assets 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank  
p-value] 
ΔC t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank  
p-value] 
Successful 
(N = 183) 
1.15 
[1.24] 
0.92 
[0.95] 
2.18 
[3.15] 
-0.23 
[-0.29] 
-1.16 (0.1318) 
[0.1568] 
1.26*** 
[2.20***] 
2.85 (0.0000) 
[0.0000] 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 
0.89 
[1.07] 
0.27 
[0.15]  
-0.62 
[-0.92*] 
-1.41 (0.1127) 
[0.0731]   
(table continued) 
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Panel C: Barber and Lyon (1997) Matched Sample Return on Assets 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
ΔC t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
Successful 
(N = 183) 
1.10 
[1.42] 
0.94 
[1.01] 
2.31 
[2.93] 
-0.16 
[-0.41] 
-1.16 (0.1318) 
[0.1250] 
1.37*** 
[1.92***] 
2.91 (0.0000) 
[0.0000] 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 
0.91 
[1.26] 
0.34 
[0.48]  
-0.57 
[-0.78] 
-1.41 (0.1127) 
[0.1029]   
 
 
Furthermore, consistent with hypothesis 3 (H3), for the 20 firms with unsuccessful 
probationary succession processes, where the new CEO end up being without being 
passed the baton, operating performance declines during the probationary period using all 
three measures.  The results, however, are statistically insignificant looking at average 
ROA figures.  This decline in operating performance, however, is significant using the 
median ROA and IAROA figures.  The sign-rank test on the differences in operating 
performance shows that there is a significant decline in the median operating 
performance of firms during the probationary period, leading them to oust their incoming 
CEOs without passing them the baton. 
Chapter 3 of my dissertation also states that these results would be expected both 
for accounting measures of operating performance and market value measures.  Table 6.2 
presents the mean abnormal stock returns for the firms using probationary succession 
processes for the same former CEO, probationary period and combined title periods. 
The changes in the operating performance of firms using probationary succession 
processes display similar behavior using abnormal returns as well as accounting 
performance measures.  Table 6.2 shows that the mean abnormal returns as well as the 
industry adjusted and matched sample mean abnormal returns for the firms in this sample 
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show no significant change during the probationary period.  However, stock performance 
of the firms using probationary succession processes seem to significantly improve after 
the successful completion of the probationary period.  The mean abnormal stock returns 
and the industry adjusted mean abnormal returns increase by 4.64% and 3.22%, 
respectively (with respective t-statistics of 5.99 and 3.79), both significant at the 1% 
level.  The matched sample mean abnormal returns using the Barber and Lyon (1997) 
methodology increase by 2.63% after the completion of the probationary period, 
significant at 5% level (t-statistic = 2.05).  The results are the same using the medians as 
well.   
On the other hand, the stock performance of the 20 firms, which end up ousting 
their new CEOs without passing the baton decline significantly during the probationary 
period.  This is consistent with H3; firms using probationary succession processes will 
successfully oust their new CEOs if they “drop the baton.”  The mean abnormal returns 
for these 20 firms decline by 1.13% during the probationary period, from 1.26% during 
the last three years of the former chairman and CEO to only 0.13% during the 
probationary period.  This decline is statistically significant at the 10% level, with a t-
statistic of -1.70 and p-value of 0.0869.  The industry adjusted and matched sample mean 
abnormal stock returns for firms with ousted new CEOs also show similar declines.  The 
industry adjusted mean abnormal returns decline by 1.17% (t-statistic  = -1.82) and the 
Barber and Lyon (1997) matched sample mean abnormal returns decline by 0.95% (t-
statistic = -1.79), both significant at the 5% level.  This decline is also present and 
sometimes more pronounced when median are used to run the same tests.  The median 
results are presented in brackets. 
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Table 6.2 
Stock Performance of Firms with Probationary Successions 
 
Former CEO refers to the last three years of the former CEO’s tenure before the succession took place.  
Probationary period refers to the transition period when the former CEO/current Chairman worked together 
with the new CEO, and the combined period refers to the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure after he 
obtains the combined CEO and Chairman of the Board title.  ΔF presents the mean difference between the 
mean abnormal stock returns before the former CEO steps down and the transition period, and ΔC refers to 
the mean difference in stock return performance after the new CEO gets the combined title.  Mean  
[median] abnormal stock returns are the average abnormal stock returns during the respective periods, 
calculated as the mean [median] difference between the stock returns of the firm and the returns on the 
CRSP value-weighted index.  Industry adjusted mean [median] abnormal returns are the average [median] 
abnormal returns for these periods net of the industry average calculated using two-digit SIC codes.  Panel 
A presents the mean [median] abnormal returns, while Panel B presents the industry adjusted mean 
[median] abnormal returns.  In Panel C, matched sample results are displayed using the Barber and Lyon 
(1997) method to match firms.  The results for medians and the sign-rank test p-values on the differences 
are presented in brackets. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
ΔC t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
Successful 
(N = 183) 
2.25 % 
[2.68%] 
1.37 %  
[1.42%] 
6.01 % 
[6.93%] 
-0.88 
[-1.26] 
-1.13 (0.1919) 
[0.1522] 
4.64*** 
[5.51***] 
5.99 (0.0000) 
[0.0000] 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 
1.26 % 
[1.78%] 
0.13 % 
[0.19%]  
-1.13* 
[-1.59**] 
-1.70 (0.0869) 
[0.0481]   
 
 
Panel B: Industry Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
ΔC t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
Successful 
(N = 183) 
1.36 % 
[1.30%] 
0.12 % 
[0.17%] 
3.34 % 
[4.08] 
-1.24 
[-1.13] 
-1.34 (0.1843) 
[0.2057] 
3.22*** 
[3.91***] 
3.79 (0.0000) 
[0.0000] 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 
0.24 % 
[0.43%] 
-0.93 % 
[-0.81%]  
-1.17** 
[-1.24**] 
-1.82 (0.0331) 
[0.0219]   
(table continued) 
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Panel C: Barber and Lyon (1997) Matched Sample Abnormal Returns 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
ΔC t-stat (p-value) 
[sign-rank 
 p-value] 
Successful 
(N = 183) 
1.09% 
[1.15%] 
0.32% 
[0.84%] 
2.95% 
[3.49%] 
-0.77 
[-0.31] 
-1.22 (0.1954) 
[0.2370] 
2.63** 
[2.65***] 
2.05 (0.0213) 
[0.0091] 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 
0.68% 
[0.79%] 
-0.27% 
[-0.23%]  
-0.95** 
[-1.02**] 
-1.79 (0.0427) 
[0.0362]   
   
These results are also consistent with Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999), who find 
that post-retirement retention on CEOs own board or service on outside boards is 
dependent on the accounting and stock performance of the CEO’s firm during his tenure.  
The increase in the operating performance of the firms after the end of the probationary 
period provide evidence to the existence of performance based incentives for departing 
CEOs as argued by Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999).   
In addition to the accounting and stock performance of their firms, the reputation 
of a CEO also depends on the policies and business decisions he implements.  Therefore, 
the former CEO would like to ensure that his policies are kept and followed.  
Simultaneously, the new CEO would have incentives to conform to the existent policies 
and keep the status quo in order to curry favor and complete the probationary period as 
quickly and easily as possible.  Once the probationary period is complete, however, the 
incentives to conform cease to exist.  Therefore, according to hypothesis 4 (H4) presented 
in Chapter 3 of my dissertation, if managerial conformism exists in probationary 
succession processes, I would expect no change in the number of policy decisions taken 
during the probationary period.  Yet, after the completion of the probationary period, I 
would expect a significant increase in the number of policy decisions.  Table 6.3 presents 
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the number of policy decisions per year undertaken by the firm during the last three years 
of the former CEO, during the probationary period and the first three years of the new 
CEO.   
The results presented in Table 6.3 show that there is a significant decline in both 
the average and the median number of policy decisions undertaken by firms with 
probationary succession processes during the probationary period.  The mean (median) 
decline in the number of annual policy decisions during the probationary period is 1.38 
(1), both statistically significant.  This decrease in the number of annual policy decisions 
is also present in the firms with unsuccessful probationary successions.  The average 
(median) decline in the number of annual policy decisions for firms with ousted new 
CEOs is 2.16 (2.5) decisions a year, both statistically significant at the 1% level.  The 
decline in policy decisions for all probationary succession processes regardless of success 
or ousting, may be due to the large information transfer costs during the probationary 
period.  It may take the new CEO a while to obtain all the critical strategic information 
about the company, and this information transfer period might be the cause for the 
significantly lower number of annual policy decisions during the probationary period. 
The average (median) number of policy decisions also increases significantly at 
the end of the probationary period by 2.53 (2) decisions a year, both significant at the 1% 
level.  This increase at the end of the probationary period is consistent with H5. After the 
new CEO obtains the combined chairman/CEO title, his incentives to conform will be 
reduced, increasing the number of major policy decisions undertaken. 
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Table 6.3 
Number of policy decisions by firms with probationary successions 
 
The number of policy decisions for each firm have been determined by counting the results of a keyword 
search on Lexis-Nexis news and wire sources.  All newsworthy events by the company with the exception  
of routine announcements of earnings, financial report filings, have been included as policy decisions.  
Former CEO refers to the last three years of the former CEO’s tenure before the succession took place.  
Probationary period refers to the transition period when the former CEO/current Chairman worked together 
with the new CEO, and the combined period refers to the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure after he 
obtains the combined CEO and Chairman of the Board title.  ΔF presents the mean difference between the 
number of policy decisions before the former CEO steps down and the transition period, and ΔC refers to 
the difference in the number of policy decisions between the probationary period and after the new CEO 
gets the combined title.  Results for both the sample of successful successions and the ones where the new 
CEO is ousted before he can obtain the combined title are presented separately.  Panel A presents the mean 
number of policy decisions, while Panel B presents the median.  *, ** and *** represents significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Mean Number of Policy Decisions 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF t-stat 
(p-value) 
ΔC t-stat 
(p-value) 
Successful 
(N = 183) 8.33 6.95 9.38 -1.38
*** -7.04 
(0.0000) 2.53
*** 8.26 
(0.0000) 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 8.27 6.11  -2.16
*** -4.98 
(0.0000)   
 
 
 
Panel B: Median Number of Policy Decisions 
 
 Former 
CEO 
Probationary 
Period 
Combined 
Title 
ΔF Sign-
Rank Test 
p-value 
ΔC Sign-
Rank Test 
p-value 
Successful 
(N = 183) 10 9 11 -1
**  (0.0115) 2***  (0.0000) 
Ousted 
(N = 20) 8.5 6  -2.5
***  (0.0000)   
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Table 6.4 presents a sample of the main policy decisions considered in this 
analysis.  Major decisions were determined through a Lexis-Nexis search.  All 
newsworthy events were recorded with the exceptions of routine earnings 
announcements, financial report filings or announcements made about the firm by other 
sources.  Major policy announcements include managerial changes, downsizing, mergers 
and acquisitions, new production or financing lines and opportunities, new security 
issues, major asset sales and divestitures.  One interesting aspect is the number of 
managerial, board member and board composition changes that coincide with succession 
periods.  Of the 203 firms in the probationary succession sample, 187 (92%) have made 
changes to their board of directors around the succession period; 19 (9.35%) of these 
firms have actually changed the number of directors on their boards.   
 
Table 6.4 
Examples of Policy Decisions  
 
This table presents some examples of policy decisions included in the analysis.  These are not the entire 
policy changes, but they are a representative sample.   The number of firms that have announced a policy 
decision like this have been presented in the second column. 
 
Policy Decisions Number of Firms 
Management Changes 203 
Changes in Board Members 187 
Changes in Board Size 19 
Downsizing 12 
Mergers and Acquisitions 21 
New Product Lines 37 
Major Productive Investments (New plant, product facility expansions…etc) 28 
New Credit Lines 53 
New Debt Issues 71 
Seasoned Equity Issues 4 
Dividend Policy Changes (Increases, Decreases or Omissions of Dividends) 28 
Chapter 11 Filings 3 
Asset Sales 5 
Joint Venture Agreements 12 
Divestitures 17 
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6.2. Is managerial Conformism Detrimental for All Firms? Evidence from Rival 
Reactions 
 
Managerial conformism is not necessarily costly or detrimental to a firm.  
Probationary succession processes are still very common in U.S. firms, suggesting that 
their benefits may outweigh potential costs for some firms.  For some established, stable, 
well-performing corporations, managerial conformism may actually be an efficient means 
to transfer valuable information rather than being a source of loss of value.   I will use the 
reaction of the firm’s rivals to the announcement of a probationary succession process to 
determine whether managerial conformism is in fact detrimental to the firm or not.   The 
rival firms used are the firms in the same four-digit SIC code.  As stated in hypothesis 6 
(H6) in chapter 3, announcements of potentially costly managerial succession processes 
are expected to be accompanied by a positive stock price reaction from the firm’s rivals.  
On the other hand, since managerial conformism exists in probationary succession 
processes, if this conformism is expected to be beneficial to the firm, the stock price 
reaction from the rivals is expected to be negative. 
A sample of 526 rival firms has been created for the 183 firms in my sample.  
Table 6.5 presents the reactions of these rival firms to the probationary succession 
announcement.  Rival firms of each succession firm in my sample have been grouped to 
form equally weighted rival portfolios.  Then, the announcement reactions have been 
calculated using abnormal returns of the portfolio on the day of the probationary 
succession announcement and the cumulative abnormal returns on the [-1,0] two-day 
window around the announcement.  The abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns have 
been estimated using a market model. 
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The average reaction of the rival firm portfolios to the announcement of a 
probationary succession process measured by the announcement day abnormal return is 
0.0013, with a t-statistic of 1.21.  The mean cumulative abnormal return earned by rival 
firm portfolios during the two-day announcement window is 0.0041, with a t-statistic of 
1.30.  The announcement returns on the rival firm portfolios using either measurement is 
not statistically significant.  In other words, there is no market consensus on whether 
probationary succession processes are good or bad news.   
Table 6.5 
Rival Firm Announcement Returns 
 
This table presents the reactions of rival firms to the announcement of probationary succession processes in 
the sample.  The 526 rival firms in the same four-digit SIC code with the sample firms have been grouped 
into equally weighted rival firm portfolios for each succession-firm.  Abnormal returns (AR) are the mean 
abnormal stock returns on the announcement day calculated based on a market model.  Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are the two-day window [-1,0] announcement returns calculate again based on a 
market model.  The twenty firms with incomplete probationary processes are excluded from the analysis.  
In parentheses are the t-statistics of the ARs and CARs.  *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Overall Sample of Rival Firms 
Portfolios 
(N=183) 
Rival Firm Portfolios with 
Positive Reactions 
(N=110) 
Rival Firm Portfolios with 
Negative Reactions 
(N = 73) 
AR 
 
0.0013 
(1.21) 
AR 
 
0.0029* 
(1.78) 
AR 
 
-0.0007 
(-1.55) 
CAR 
 
0.0041 
(1.30) 
CAR 
 
0.0081* 
(1.90) 
CAR 
 
-0.0042 
(-1.61) 
 
However, based both on the announcement day abnormal returns and the two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns, 110 out of the 183 firms in my sample (60%) have rival 
firm portfolios that experience positive returns.  The remaining 73 firms (40%) have rival 
firm portfolios with negative reactions.  Moreover, the positive rival firm reactions are 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, while the negative reactions, 
measured by either method, are not statistically significant.  These results indicate that, 
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consistent with the premise of this dissertation, managerial conformism is expected to be 
more costly than beneficial by the market. 
Table 6.6 
Rival Firm Reactions and Probationary Period Performance 
 
This table presents the operating performance, stock performance and the number of policy decisions after 
the completion of the probationary period for firms with positive and negative rival firm portfolio reactions 
to the managerial succession announcement. Operating performance is measured by Return on Assets.  
Mean abnormal stock returns are the average abnormal stock returns during the respective periods, 
calculated as the mean difference between the stock returns of the firm and the returns on the CRSP value-
weighted index.  The number of policy decisions for each firm have been determined by counting the 
results of a keyword search on Lexis-Nexis news and wire sources.  All newsworthy events by the 
company with the exception of routine announcements of earnings, financial report filings, have been 
included as policy decisions.    T-statistics are presented in parentheses.   *, ** and *** represents 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Probationary 
Period 
Performance 
Overall 
Sample 
(N=183) 
Firms with Positive Rival 
Reactions 
(N=110) 
Firms with Negative 
Rival Reactions 
(N=73) 
Difference 
Test 
Operating 
Performance (ROA) 
3.09 2.47 4.02 -1.55** 
(2.01) 
Stock Performance 
(Mean AR) 
1.37 1.20 1.63 -0.43** 
(-1.97) 
Number of Policy 
Decisions 
6.95 6.60 7.47 -0.87 
(1.65) 
 
If the markets can efficiently determine whether the probationary succession 
process is costly or beneficial to the firm, then firms with beneficial probationary periods 
should significantly outperform those with costly succession periods during the 
probationary period.  In other words, firms whose rival firm portfolios show positive 
announcement returns are expected to have significantly worse performance during the 
probationary period compared to those firms with negative rival firm portfolio 
announcement returns.  Table 6.6 compares the accounting operating performance, stock 
performance and number of policy decisions during the probationary period for firms 
with positive and negative rival firm portfolio reactions.  The results are consistent with 
my expectation that firms with costly managerial conformism also significantly 
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underperform during the probationary period compared to the firms with beneficial 
managerial conformism. 
The existence of managerial conformism is documented above by the change in 
operating performance, stock performance and number of policy decisions of a firm at the 
end of the probationary period.  Therefore, I compare these variables for firms in my 
sample whose rivals show positive reactions and those whose rivals show negative 
reactions.  Table 6.7 presents these results. 
 
Table 6.7 
Rival firm reactions and managerial conformism 
 
This table presents the changes in operating performance, stock performance and the number of policy 
decisions after the completion of the probationary period for firms with positive and negative rival 
reactions to the managerial succession announcement. ΔC refers to the mean difference in these variables 
after the new CEO gets the combined title. Operating performance is measured by Return on Assets.  Mean 
abnormal stock returns are the average abnormal stock returns during the respective periods, calculated as 
the mean difference between the stock returns of the firm and the returns on the CRSP value-weighted 
index.  The number of policy decisions for each firm have been determined by counting the results of a 
keyword search on Lexis-Nexis news and wire sources.  All newsworthy events by the company with the 
exception of routine announcements of earnings, financial report filings, have been included as policy 
decisions.    T-statistics are presented in parentheses.   *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
ΔC 
Overall 
Sample 
(N=183) 
Firms with Positive Rival 
Reactions 
(N=110) 
Firms with Negative 
Rival Reactions 
(N=73) 
Difference 
Test 
Operating 
Performance (ROA) 
1.93*** 
(2.97) 
2.18*** 
(3.14) 
1.55* 
(1.73) 
0.63* 
(1.78) 
Stock Performance 
(Mean AR) 
4.64*** 
(5.99) 
5.92*** 
(6.01) 
2.71* 
(1.70) 
3.21* 
(1.70) 
Number of Policy 
Decisions 
2.53*** 
(8.26) 
3.49*** 
(8.29) 
1.08* 
(1.81) 
2.41** 
(2.01) 
 
Firms have been grouped into those with positive reactions from their rival firm 
portfolios and those with negative rival reactions based on the sign of the mean rival firm 
portfolio reaction for each firm.    The results in Table 6.7 show that the increase in 
operating performance, stock performance and the number of policy decisions at the 
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completion of the probationary period is significantly higher for firms with positive rival 
reactions.  This result is consistent with my expectation that if the costs of managerial 
conformism are high, then the rivals of the firm should benefit from the decision of 
managerial succession.  In other words, the market anticipates the incentive problems 
between the departing and the incoming CEOs in a probationary succession process and 
the stock prices of the rival firms reflect this anticipation at the announcement of the 
managerial succession plan.  These findings imply that probationary succession processes 
should only be used by firms that can shoulder these agency costs. 
The next question that follows this is: Which firms should use probationary 
succession processes?  Since the conflicts of interest that arise in these managerial 
succession schemes are detrimental only to certain firms, I try to see whether there is a 
difference between the characteristics of the firms with positive rival reactions to 
probationary succession and those with negative reactions.  Table 6.8 compares the 
descriptive statistics of the two sub-samples to see whether there are any differences. 
Consistent with Parrino (1997), Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2001) and Naveen 
(2003), firms that receive negative reactions from their rivals, in other words have 
potentially beneficial probationary succession processes, are significantly larger in terms 
of their median.  The mean size of the firms is not statistically different, but this may be 
due to the large variation in the size of the firms in my sample.   
The results in Table 6.8 also show that firms with negative rival reactions have 
significantly larger percentage of institutional ownership, board stock ownership and a 
higher percentage of outside members on the board.  This indicates that better outside and 
board monitoring in the firm serves as a signal to the market that less conflicts of interest 
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are likely to arise during the probationary period.  In other firms, the costs of 
probationary succession processes are not detrimental in firms with efficient monitoring 
mechanisms. 
Table 6.8 
Descriptives of the firms with positive and negative rival reactions 
 
CEO ages, prior time spent in the firm and the departing CEO tenure as CEO are all measured in terms of 
years.  Departing CEO and chairman share ownership and institutional ownership measure the percentage 
of the firm’s stock owned by the incumbent CEO and by institutional investors, respectively.  Board Stock 
ownership measures the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by Board members except the departing 
and/or incoming CEO and the Chairman of the Board.  Probationary period is the number of years it takes 
for new CEO to be granted the combined CEO/Chairman of the Board title, during which the old and the 
new CEO work together.  Board size is the number of directors that serve on the board of the firm.  The 
percentage of outside board members measures the proportion of directors on the Board of the firm that are 
not former employees of the firm and have no business relationships with the firm.  Sales and assets of the 
firms are also presented in millions of dollars. T-statistics for the difference in means test and Wilcoxon z-
statistics for the difference in medians tests are provided. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Firms with 
Positive Rival 
Reactions 
(N=110) 
Firms with 
Negative Rival 
Reactions 
(N=73) 
Difference 
in Means 
Test 
Difference 
in Medians 
Test 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-stat 
Departing CEO and Chairman Age 63.12 64 59.93 62 1.67 1.59 
Departing CEO and Chairman Tenure 
as Chairman 
8.94 8 7.26 6.5 1.70* 1.82* 
Departing CEO and Chairman Tenure 
as CEO 
10.15 9 8.30 8 1.76* 1.80* 
Departing CEO and Chairman Prior 
Time with the Firm 
22.57 19 20.39 15 1.49 1.61 
Departing CEO and Chairman Share 
Ownership (%) 
5.72 1.42 6.01 1.40 -1.09 0.62 
Incoming CEO Age 51.39 50 48.23 50 1.43 1.04 
Incoming CEO Prior Time with the 
Firm 
8.27 4 10.05 6 -1.91* -1.76* 
Incoming CEO Prior Time as a director 
on the board 
1.87 2 2.16 3 -2.01** -1.64 
Incoming CEO Share Ownership (%) 1.21 <1 1.96 <1 -1.23 -0.59 
Length of the Probationary Period 3.53 3 2.20 2 1.89* 1.70* 
Board Size 9.27 9 8.11 9 1.16 0.94 
Outside Board Members (%) 27.19 30 41.38 40 -2.05** -1.97** 
Institutional Ownership (%) 31.04 35 37.21 38 -3.10*** -1.89* 
Board Stock Ownership (%) 5.71 2 6.18 3 -1.74* -1.80* 
Market Capitalization ($millions) 1472.1 124.41 1645.94 205.36 1.09 -2.34*** 
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The results in this chapter show that managerial conformism does exist in 
probationary succession processes.  Consistent with expectations, there are no changes in 
operating performance, stock performance or the number of policy decisions undertaken 
during the probationary period.  Yet, all of these measures improve significantly at the 
conclusion of the test period.  Probationary processes also serve to successfully oust non-
performing incoming CEOs before they can obtain the combined title. 
Managerial conformism is not exactly detrimental for all firms though.  My 
results using the reaction of rival firms to the managerial succession announcements 
show that larger firms with better means of external control can beneficially use the 
relay-race-type succession process. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE LEVEL OF MANAGERIAL 
CONFORMISM: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
This chapter provides results from regression analysis to determine the factors and 
the levels to which these factors influence managerial conformism.  Several different 
regression analyses have been used in this section to distinguish the determinants of 
managerial conformism. 
Table 7.1 presents the results of logit regressions that directly measure the 
probability of managerial conformism in a firm.  The dependent variable is set equal to 
one if there is an increase in the number of policy decisions after the probationary period 
is over and there is also an increase in the operating performance of the firm measured by 
both the ROA and industry adjusted ROA.17  Independent variables measuring 
managerial entrenchment, effectiveness of board and outside monitoring, the departing 
CEO’s stock ownership in the firm, post-retirement employment possibilities and 
incoming CEO’s characteristics are included in these regressions.  Additionally, control 
variables that measure firm characteristics like firm size, age, market-to-book ratio and 
the number of business segments are included. 
If the departing CEO is more entrenched in the company, conflicts of interest 
between the former and new CEOs will be greater.  Following hypotheses H9 through H12 
in Chapter 3, the following entrenchment variables are included in the regression: 
• The tenure of the departing CEO as chairman or as CEO 
• The time the departing CEO has spent as an employee of the firm 
                                                 
17 Same analysis has been conducted with a dummy variable that equals one if the matched sample ROA 
increases after the probationary period is over.  The results are qualitatively the same, so only one of the 
regressions have been presented. 
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• A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the departing CEO is the 
founder of the firm or a member of the founding family 
• A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the departing CEO is the 
founder or a member of the founding family, but will be succeeded by an 
individual outside the founding family 
The longer time the departing CEO has spent as an employee of the firm or in the 
CEO position, the more the former CEO is expected to get entrenched to the firm.  More 
entrenched CEOs are expected to have greater presence on the board as well as the 
general corporate culture of the firm, increasing the probability of managerial 
conformism. 
On the other hand, effective board monitoring of manager actions as well as 
outside monitoring of the firm is expected to reduce the agency conflicts between the 
departing and the incoming CEOs, and thus reduce the probability of managerial 
conformism.  The percentage stock ownership by institutional investors, stock ownership 
by board members who are not chairmen or CEOs and the percentage of outsiders that sit 
on the board are used to measure the effectiveness of outside and board monitoring on the 
firm.  I expect these variables to reduce the probability of managerial conformism.  On 
the other hand, board size is included as a measure of board efficiency, and I expect 
larger boards to be less effective monitors. 
If the departing CEO is retained on the board of directors of his own firm, then 
the probability of managerial conformism should increase, since the influence of the 
former CEO will still be apparent on the board even after the conclusion of the 
probationary period.  However, if the incoming CEO has been employed with the firm for  
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Table 7.1 
Determinants of the Probability of Managerial Conformism 
 
The results of a logit regression predicting the probability of managerial conformism are presented.  The 
dependent variable has been set equal to one if there is an increase in the number of policy decisions after 
the transition period is over and there is an improvement in the operating performance of the firm measured 
by both ROA and industry adjusted ROA, after the transition period is over.  Log size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
its book value.  Firm age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the 
probationary period.  Departing CEO tenure measures the number of years the departing CEO has been 
holding the office of CEO prior to stepping down.  Founder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the former CEO is the founder of the company or a member of the founding family.  Founder replaced by 
non-founder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a member of the founding family is replaced 
as CEO by a successor who is not from the founding family.  Institutional ownership, departing CEO 
ownership and Board of directors ownership represent the percentage of stock ownership by institutional 
investors, by the departing CEO and by the members of the board that are neither Chairman or CEO.  
Board size measures the number of directors sitting on a firm’s board.  Finally the percentage of outside 
board membership measures the ratio of the board members that are not former employees of the firm or 
have business relationships with the firm to the entire size of the Board of Directors.  The 20 firms with 
incomplete succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 0.92 
(0.84) 
0.53 
(0.58) 
0.48 
(0.52) 
0.82 
(1.01) 
0.99 
(1.11) 
0.97 
(1.10) 
0.54 
(0.88) 
0.95 
(1.04) 
0.55 
(0.71) 
Log Size -0.86** 
(-2.28) 
-0.54** 
(-2.25) 
-0.56** 
(-2.16) 
-0.69** 
(-2.29) 
-0.53** 
(-2.12) 
-0.49** 
(-2.18) 
-0.45** 
(-2.08) 
-0.59** 
(-2.04) 
-0.79** 
(-2.23) 
Firm Age -0.04* 
(-1.72) 
-0.04* 
(-1.74) 
-0.05* 
(-1.76) 
-0.04* 
(-1.79) 
-0.06* 
(-1.76) 
-0.05* 
(-1.88) 
-0.03* 
(-1.69) 
-0.01 
(-1.58) 
-0.08** 
(-1.99) 
Market-to-Book 0.003 
(0.79) 
0.005 
(0.57) 
0.003 
(0.46) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
0.003 
(0.72) 
0.007 
(1.06) 
0.005 
(1.05) 
0.004 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(0.69) C
on
tro
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Number of 
Business Segments 
0.002 
(1.03) 
0.004 
(1.07) 
0.007 
(1.10) 
0.003 
(1.07) 
0.002 
(1.04) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.008 
(1.12) 
0.006 
(1.11) 
0.004 
(1.06) 
 Departing CEO 
Ownership 
-0.0042 
(-1.29) 
        
Departing CEO 
Tenure 
 0.103*** 
(2.79) 
       
Departing CEO 
Time Employed in 
the Company 
  0.093** 
(2.01) 
      
Founder?    0.95
*** 
(4.03) 
     
En
tre
nc
hm
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Founder Replaced 
by Non-founder 
    0.87*** 
(3.48) 
    
Institutional 
Ownership 
     -0.008 
(-1.16) 
   
Board Ownership       -0.006* 
(-1.92) 
  
Board Size        -0.002 
(-1.05) 
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Outside Board 
Members 
        -0.01 
(-1.15) 
 R2 0.22 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.33 
 N 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
 
The results of a logit regression predicting the probability of managerial conformism are presented.  The 
dependent variable has been set equal to one if there is an increase in the number of policy decisions after 
the transition period is over and there is an improvement in the operating performance of the firm measured 
by both ROA and industry adjusted ROA, after the transition period is over.  Log size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
its book value.  Firm age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the 
probationary period.  Retained on own board, chairman emeritus and served on other boards are dummy 
variables that take the value of one if the departing CEO remain on his own board as a director, serves as 
chairman emeritus or serves as a director on other companies’ boards, respectively.   Incoming CEO’s time 
with the company measures the number of years the incoming CEO has been employed by the company.  
Incoming CEO stock ownership measures the percentage stock ownership of the incoming CEO, while the 
dummy variable outsider takes the value of one if the incoming CEO is an outsider.  The 20 firms with 
incomplete succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Intercept 0.43 
(0.51) 
0.97 
(1.09) 
0.55 
(0.70) 
0.37 
(0.41) 
0.67 
(0.82) 
0.71 
(0.88) 
Log Size -0.85** 
(-2.29) 
-0.56** 
(-2.14) 
-0.74** 
(-2.21) 
-0.59** 
(-2.15) 
-0.69** 
(-2.18) 
-0.57** 
(-2.14) 
Firm Age -0.02* 
(-1.72) 
-0.04* 
(-1.74) 
-0.05* 
(-1.76) 
-0.04* 
(-1.76) 
-0.06* 
(-1.76) 
-0.05* 
(-1.74) 
Market-to-Book 0.003 
(0.76) 
0.002 
(0.68) 
0.003 
(0.74) 
0.005 
(0.99) 
0.007 
(1.02) 
0.004 
(0.89) C
on
tro
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Number of 
Business Segments 
0.006 
(1.05) 
0.004 
(1.02) 
0.007 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(1.01) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.009 
(1.15) 
Retained on own 
board? 
0.85*** 
(3.42) 
     
Chairman 
Emeritus? 
 0.49** 
(2.15) 
    
Po
st
-
R
et
ire
m
en
t 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Serves on other 
boards? 
  -0.21 
(-1.54) 
   
Incoming CEO 
time employed in 
the company 
   -0.24* 
(-1.78) 
  
Incoming CEO 
stock ownership 
    -0.008** 
(-2.09) 
 
In
co
m
in
g 
C
EO
 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Outsider?  
 
    -0.96*** 
(-2.54) 
 R2 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.25 
 N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
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a long time and has significant stock ownership in the firm, then his incentives to 
conform would be lowered, decreasing the probability of managerial conformism. 
The results presented in Table 7.1 show that consistent with H21 larger and older 
firms have a lower probability of managerial conformism.  In all sixteen regression 
equations, both firm size and age have consistently negative and significant effects on the 
probability of managerial conformism.  On the other hand, market-to-book ratios and the 
number of business segments have no significant effects on the probability of managerial 
conformism.   
All four of the entrenchment variables significantly increase the probability of 
managerial conformism, while only the percentage of share ownership by non-CEO and 
non-chairman board members, out of the monitoring variables, seems to have a reducing 
effect on the probability of managerial conformism.  The other variables measuring the 
monitoring effectiveness of the board and outside factors, namely board size, percentage 
of outsiders on the board and the percentage of institutional ownership, have negative 
coefficients as expected, yet none of these factors seem to have statistically significant 
effects on the probability of managerial conformism. 
The incentive conflicts between the departing and incoming CEOs would be 
reduced in the Jensen and Meckling (1976) sense with increases in the share ownership of 
the departing CEO.  Since these shares owned by the departing CEO would align his 
interests with those of the shareholders and thus the new CEO, agency conflicts should be 
reduced, reducing the probability of managerial conformism.  The coefficient for the 
departing CEO ownership variable in Table 7.1 is accordingly negative, yet insignificant; 
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implying that departing CEO’s stock ownership does not provide him with enough 
incentives to forego advocating conformism.   
The post-retirement career opportunities of the departing CEO are what create the 
conflicts of interest in the first place.  Regressions (10) and (11) show that departing 
CEOs who are retained on their own boards as directors or chairman emeriti increase the 
probability of managerial conformism.  Both variables have statistically significant 
positive coefficients.  However, the coefficient for the “serve on other boards?” variable 
is negative though not statistically significant.  This result inconsistent with H20 may 
mean that the incentives provided by efficient labor markets work to reduce managerial 
conformism problems.      
Aligning the incentives of the incoming CEO with those of the shareholders 
seems to help reduce the incentives of the newcomer to conform in order to curry favor 
and reduce the length of the probationary period.  The longer the new CEO has worked in 
the company before becoming CEO and the higher the percentage of his stock ownership, 
the lower is the probability of managerial conformism.  Both these results are statistically 
significant.  In other words, incoming CEO’s incentives to conform are reduced, the more 
familiar he is with the corporate culture of the company.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, if the new CEO is an outsider, then the probability of managerial conformism 
is significantly lower than if the incoming CEO is an insider.   
The length of the probationary period can serve as a proxy for the severity of the 
agency costs between the incumbent/departing and the new CEOs in probationary 
succession processes, since the more the departing CEO tries to secure the continuation 
of his policies, the longer it would take for the new CEO to pass the test, and be awarded 
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the combined title of CEO and chairman of the board.  Moreover, the more conflicts of 
interest arise between the incumbent and the new CEO, the harder it would be and the 
longer it would take for the new CEO to successfully complete the probationary period.  
Table 7.2 presents regression results using the length of the probationary period as the 
dependent variable and the same determinants of managerial conformism as the 
independent variables. 
Similar to the results in Table 7.1, results presented in this table also show that 
firm size and age reduce the problems associated with managerial conformism.  The 
probationary period is significantly shorter in larger and older firms.  All measures of 
managerial entrenchment have significantly positive coefficients.  The more entrenched 
the departing CEO is, the longer the probation process takes.  This is expected since more 
entrenched CEOs are will have more incentives to ensure that their successors conform.  
At the same time, the more entrenched departing CEOs will have more power over the 
other members of the board, making the probationary period longer and harder for the 
successor.   
On the other hand, all independent variables used to measure board and outside 
monitoring on the firm, except for board size, significantly reduce the length of the 
probationary period.  Firms with boards with a higher percentage of outside members and 
firms where the stock ownership of the board members other than the CEO and the 
chairman are high have significantly shorter probationary periods.  Increased institutional 
ownership significantly reduces the probation period as well (t-statistic = -2.07).  Only 
board size seems to have an insignificant effect (t-statistic = -1.57).   
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Table 7.2 
Determinants of the Length of the Probationary Period 
 
The dependent variable in the regression models is the length of the probationary period, in years, when the 
new CEO and the departing CEO/current Chairman work together.  Log size is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value.  
Firm age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the probationary 
period.  Departing CEO tenure measures the number of years the departing CEO has been holding the 
office of CEO prior to stepping down.  Founder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
former CEO is the founder of the company or a member of the founding family.  Founder replaced by non-
founder is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a member of the founding family is replaced as 
CEO by a successor who is not from the founding family.  Institutional ownership, departing CEO 
ownership and Board of directors ownership represent the percentage of stock ownership by institutional 
investors, by the departing CEO and by the members of the board that are neither Chairman or CEO.  
Board size measures the number of directors sitting on a firm’s board.  Finally the percentage of outside 
board membership measures the ratio of the board members that are not former employees of the firm or 
have business relationships with the firm to the entire size of the Board of Directors.  The 20 firms with 
incomplete succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 1.29 
(0.68) 
1.23 
(0.56) 
1.31 
(0.72) 
1.33 
(0.74) 
1.12 
(0.45) 
1.46 
(0.80) 
1.11 
(0.77) 
1.06 
(0.53) 
1.15 
(0.47) 
Log Size -2.04** 
(-2.18) 
-1.99** 
(-1.87) 
-2.07** 
(-2.04) 
-2.10** 
(-2.12) 
-2.13** 
(-2.09) 
-2.18** 
(-2.10) 
-2.19** 
(-2.07) 
-2.28*** 
(-2.40) 
-2.07*** 
(-2.00) 
Firm Age -1.01* 
(-1.95) 
-1.12** 
(-2.07) 
-1.05** 
(-2.01) 
-1.00* 
(-1.71) 
-1.04* 
(-1.73) 
-1.09* 
(-1.78) 
-1.03* 
(-1.83) 
-0.98* 
(-1.72) 
-1.08* 
(-1.89) 
Market-to-Book -0.034 
(-1.15) 
0.020 
(0.71) 
0.016 
(0.53) 
-0.024 
(-0.85) 
-0.048 
(-1.19) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
0.029 
(0.91) 
0.027 
(1.03) C
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l V
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es
 
Number of 
Business Segments 
0.56** 
(1.92) 
0.68** 
(1.94) 
0.42* 
(1.69) 
0.32* 
(1.69) 
0.74** 
(1.87) 
0.81** 
(1.95) 
0.29 
(1.68) 
0.47* 
(1.71) 
0.93** 
(1.97) 
 Departing CEO 
Ownership 
-0.17 
(-1.42) 
        
Departing CEO 
Tenure 
 0.63** 
(2.27) 
       
Departing CEO 
Time Employed in 
the Company 
  0.78*** 
(2.34) 
      
Founder?    2.09
*** 
(3.25) 
     
En
tre
nc
hm
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Founder Replaced 
by Non-founder 
    2.03*** 
(3.07) 
    
Institutional 
Ownership 
     -0.11** 
(-2.07) 
   
Board Ownership       -0.66*** 
(-2.64) 
  
Board Size        -0.25 
(-1.57) 
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Outside Board 
Members 
        -0.79** 
(-2.04) 
 R2 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 
 N 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
 
The dependent variable in the regression models is the length of the probationary period, in years, when the 
new CEO and the departing CEO/current Chairman work together.  Log size is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value.  
Firm age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the probationary 
period.  Retained on own board, chairman emeritus and served on other boards are dummy variables that 
take the value of one if the departing CEO remain on his own board as a director, serves as chairman 
emeritus or serves as a director on other companies’ boards, respectively.  Incoming CEO’s time with the 
company measures the number of years the incoming CEO has been employed by the company.  Incoming 
CEO stock ownership measures the percentage stock ownership of the incoming CEO, while the dummy 
variable outsider takes the value of one if the incoming CEO is an outsider.  The 20 firms with incomplete 
succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Intercept 1.09 
(0.54) 
1.11 
(0.77) 
1.31 
(0.72) 
1.42 
(0.78) 
1.29 
(0.68) 
1.38 
(0.80) 
Log Size -2.23** 
(-2.24) 
-2.04** 
(-2.07) 
-1.99** 
(-1.87) 
-2.15** 
(-2.09) 
-2.07** 
(-2.04) 
-2.19** 
(-2.07) 
Firm Age -1.03* 
(-1.83) 
-1.01* 
(-1.95) 
-1.09* 
(-1.78) 
-1.08* 
(-1.81) 
-1.05** 
(-2.01) 
-1.07* 
(-1.92) 
Market-to-Book 0.003 
(0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
-0.034 
(-1.15) 
-0.013 
(-0.99) 
0.005 
(0.47) C
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l V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Number of 
Business Segments 
0.90* 
(1.87) 
0.81** 
(1.95) 
0.74** 
(1.87) 
0.56** 
(1.92) 
0.42* 
(1.71) 
0.32* 
(1.70) 
Retained on own 
board? 
1.89 
(1.45) 
     
Chairman 
Emeritus? 
 1.54 
(1.28) 
    
Po
st
-
R
et
ire
m
en
t 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Serves on other 
boards? 
  2.01*** 
(3.15) 
   
Incoming CEO 
time employed in 
the company 
   -1.42** 
(-2.06) 
  
Incoming CEO 
stock ownership 
    -0.68*** 
(-3.71) 
 
In
co
m
in
g 
C
EO
 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Outsider?      -1.84* 
(-1.93) 
 R2 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 
 N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
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Whether the departing CEO is retained on his own firm’s board as a director at 
the end of the probationary period or not has no significant effect on the length of the 
probationary period.  The coefficients for the dummy variables that measure whether the 
departing CEO remain on his own board as a director or as chairman emeritus are both 
positive but statistically not significant (t-statistics equal 1.45 and 1.28, respectively).  
Yet, the probationary period for the successors of those departing CEOs, who go on to 
serve on other firms’ boards, is significantly longer (t-statistic = 3.15).   
The characteristics of the successor are again important in determining the level 
of managerial conformism in the firm.  The length of the probationary period is 
significantly shorter in firms where the incoming CEO has been employed in the 
company for longer periods of time and owns more stock.  Furthermore, if the successor 
is an outsider, the probationary period is significantly reduced (t-statistic = 1.93).   
Similar again to the results in Table 7.1, the stock ownership of the departing 
CEO does not have any significant effects on the length of the probationary period, 
implying that the basic solution of aligning shareholder and departing manager’s 
incentives is not enough to solve this agency problem. 
The tests presented in tables 7.1 and 7.2 have also been redone by restricting the 
sample to firms with probationary periods between 6 months and 6 years, leaving out 4 
outliers.  However, the results are qualitatively the same. 
Due to the high correlations between the proxies used in the regression 
specifications, most of the power of the tests disappears when all variables are used in the 
regression.  To remedy this problem, I carry out a principal components analysis with the 
15 proxy variables used in these regressions to measure managerial entrenchment, 
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monitoring effectiveness of the board, departing CEO’s post-retirement employment 
opportunities and the incoming CEO’s characteristics.   Five components result with 
eigenvalues greater than one.  The three components with eigenvalues greater than one 
that have high loadings on entrenchment variables, post-retirement employment dummies 
and incoming CEO variables have been named entrenchment component, post-retirement 
component and incoming CEO component, respectively.  Two of the components with 
eigenvalues greater than one have high loadings on monitoring efficiency variables.  One 
of them has the highest loading on institutional ownership variable, while the other one 
loads on the stock ownership of board members.  These two components have been 
called monitoring component (institutional ownership) and monitoring component (board 
ownership), respectively.  The logit and OLS regressions presented in tables 7.1 and 7.2 
have been redone using these components as independent variables in addition to the 
control variables.  The results are presented in tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
As presented in Table 7.3, using the components derived from the principal 
components analysis does not change the results.  Larger and older firms, since they are 
easier to monitor and compare, have significantly lower probability of managerial 
conformism.  While the entrenchment of the departing CEO significantly increases the 
probability of managerial conformism, the incoming CEOs tenure and stock ownership 
reduce the probability of managerial conformism.  More effective monitoring by 
institutional investors and aligning the incentives of the directors with those of the 
shareholders work to reduce the probability of managerial conformism.  Also, departing 
CEOs with more post-retirement opportunities seem to have a higher likelihood to engage 
in managerial conformism.  Departing CEO’s stock ownership does not seem to be 
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effective in aligning the interests of the departing CEO with those of the shareholders and 
reducing managerial conformism. 
Table 7.3 
Determinants of the Probability of Managerial Conformism  
(Using the Principal Components Analysis Results) 
 
The results of a logit regression predicting the probability of managerial conformism are presented.  The 
dependent variable has been set equal to one if there is an increase in the number of policy decisions after 
the transition period is over and there is an improvement in the operating performance of the firm measured 
by both ROA and industry adjusted ROA, after the transition period is over.  Log size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
its book value.  Firm age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the 
probationary period.  Managerial entrenchment, monitoring, post-retirement career and incoming CEO 
components are the five components with eigenvalues greater than one in the principal components 
analysis.  The 20 firms with incomplete succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All 
errors are White-corrected for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.31 
(1.49) 
0.14 
(1.35) 
0.13 
(1.29) 
0.24 
(1.33) 
0.26 
(1.41) 
0.03 
(1.25) 
Log Size -0.73* 
(-1.75) 
-0.58* 
(-1.72) 
-0.61* 
(-1.70) 
-0.64* 
(-1.81) 
-0.52* 
(-1.77) 
-0.46* 
(-1.74) 
Firm Age -0.004* 
(-1.89) 
-0.003* 
(-1.84) 
-0.002* 
(-1.81) 
-0.006* 
(-1.92) 
-0.005* 
(-1.90) 
-0.004* 
(-1.91) 
Market-to-Book 0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(-0.41) 
-0.008 
(-0.74) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
-0.003 
(-0.34) 
0.004 
(0.46) 
Number of Business Segments 0.001 
(1.49) 
0.002 
(1.51) 
0.007 
(1.63) 
0.003 
(1.56) 
0.002 
(1.50) 
0.005 
(1.59) 
Departing CEO Stock Ownership -0.17 
(-1.54) 
-0.14 
(-1.48) 
-0.21 
(-1.62) 
-0.16 
(-1.51) 
-0.20 
(-1.58) 
-0.19 
(-1.58) 
Managerial Entrenchment 
Component 
0.92*** 
(2.34) 
    0.11* 
(1.78) 
Monitoring Component 
(Institutional Ownership) 
 -0.51*** 
(-3.22) 
   -0.16* 
(-1.90) 
Monitoring Component 
(Board Ownership) 
  -0.24** 
(-2.05) 
  -0.18* 
(-1.84) 
Post-Retirement 
Career Component 
   0.05** 
(1.99) 
 0.03* 
(1.70) 
Incoming CEO Component     -0.19*** 
(-2.50) 
-0.04* 
(-1.89) 
R2 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.47 
N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
 
 Table 7.4 repeats the analysis in Table 7.2 using the principal components instead 
of the actual proxies as independent variables.  The results are similar to those is Table 
7.2 and 7.3.  The only interesting observation in Table 7.4 is that the component 
 - 105 - 
measuring the post-retirement career opportunities of the departing CEO loses its 
significance when paired with other explanatory variables.   
 
 
Table 7.4 
Determinants of the Length of the Probationary Period  
(Using the Principal Components Analysis Results) 
 
The dependent variable in the regression models is the length of the probationary period, in years, when the 
new CEO and the departing CEO/current Chairman work together.  Log size is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value.  
Firm age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the probationary 
period.  Managerial entrenchment, monitoring, post-retirement career and incoming CEO components are 
the five components with eigenvalues greater than one in the principal components analysis.  The 20 firms 
with incomplete succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-
corrected for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.14 
(0.93) 
1.16 
(0.95) 
1.35 
(1.12) 
1.26 
(1.07) 
1.20 
(1.05) 
1.08 
(0.79) 
Log Size -1.72* 
(-1.94) 
-1.82** 
(-1.99) 
-1.70* 
(-1.90) 
-1.68* 
(-1.89) 
-1.71* 
(-1.90) 
-1.59* 
(-1.77) 
Firm Age -0.03* 
(-1.86) 
-0.04* 
(-1.90) 
-0.02* 
(-1.75) 
-0.02* 
(-1.75) 
-0.05* 
(-1.90) 
-0.03* 
(-1.88) 
Market-to-Book 0.002 
(1.42) 
0.005 
(1.56) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
0.005 
(1.54) 
0.003 
(1.52) 
0.004 
(1.52) 
Number of Business Segments 1.07 
(1.53) 
1.03 
(1.43) 
1.04 
(1.46) 
1.06 
(1.50) 
1.02 
(1.40) 
1.02 
(1.41) 
Departing CEO Stock Ownership -1.10 
(-0.98) 
-1.09 
(-0.99) 
-1.05 
(-0.98) 
-1.06 
(-0.97) 
-1.12 
(-0.99) 
-1.02 
(-0.91) 
Managerial Entrenchment 
Component 
2.07** 
(1.97) 
    -1.58* 
(-1.89) 
Monitoring Component 
(Institutional Ownership) 
 -0.78*** 
(-3.01) 
   -0.74** 
(-2.06) 
Monitoring Component 
(Board Ownership) 
  -2.13*** 
(-2.45) 
  -1.88** 
(-1.97) 
Post-Retirement 
Career Component 
   1.58* 
(1.70) 
 1.40 
(1.63) 
Incoming CEO Component     -1.08** 
(-2.00) 
-1.01** 
(-1.99) 
R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 
N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
 
The more serious the agency problem between the departing and the incoming 
CEO during the probationary period, the higher should the increase be in the operating 
performance of the firm at the end of the probationary period.  As managerial 
conformism increases, the effects of the successful completion of the probationary period 
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should be more pronounced.  Therefore, I run similar regressions models on the increase 
in operating performance, measured both by ROA and abnormal stock returns, and the 
increase in the number of policy decisions.  Table 7.5 shows the results for the regression 
models using the change in operating performance, measured by the change in ROA18 at 
the end of the probationary period, as the dependent variable and the entrenchment, 
monitoring, post-retirement and incoming CEO components. 
Results are similar to those presented in previous tables.  Managerial conformism 
is significantly higher in smaller and younger firms.  The level of diversification in the 
firm or the firm’s growth potential does not seem to have significant effects on the level 
of managerial conformism. The stock ownership of the departing CEO fails to reduce the 
level of managerial conformism again.  Consistent with expectations, the regression 
coefficients of the departing CEO ownership variable are negative in all six regression 
models; yet, the effect is not statistically significant.  Again similar to the previous tables, 
entrenchment of the departing CEO inflates the managerial conformism problem, while 
effective board and outside controlling reduces it.  The component measuring the post-
retirement career opportunities of the departing CEO has a significantly positive 
coefficient, consistent with the hypotheses in chapter 3. 
Table 7.6 repeats the same tests for the level of managerial conformism using 
stock performance as the dependent variable.  The results are again similar to those in the 
previous tables.  Older and larger firms experience significantly lower levels of 
managerial conformism, while the level of diversification or the growth potential of the 
                                                 
18 Similar regressions have been run using the increases in industry adjusted ROA and Barber and Lyon 
(1997) matched sample ROA, but the results are qualitatively the same.  Therefore, in order to be consistent 
with literature ROA results have been presented. 
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firm, measured by market-to-book ratio have no significant effects on the level of 
managerial conformism. 
Table 7.5 
Determinants of the Change in Operating Performance 
(Using the Principal Components Analysis Results) 
 
The dependent variable in the regression models is the change in the operating performance (change in 
ROA) of the firm upon the conclusion of the probationary period when the new CEO takes on the 
combined CEO and Chairman of the Board title (i.e. ΔC)  Log size is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of the firm, and market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value.  Firm 
age is the number of years since the establishment of the company until the start of the probationary period.  
Managerial entrenchment, monitoring, post-retirement career and incoming CEO components are the five 
components with eigenvalues greater than one in the principal components analysis.  The 20 firms with 
incomplete succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.06 
(1.21) 
1.18 
(1.36) 
1.26 
(1.41) 
1.01 
(1.24) 
1.36 
(1.51) 
1.13 
(1.29) 
Log Size -1.61* 
(-1.74) 
-1.58* 
(-1.77) 
-1.72* 
(-1.80) 
-1.64* 
(-1.75) 
-1.69* 
(-1.78) 
-1.52* 
(-1.72) 
Firm Age -0.04* 
(-1.89) 
-0.03* 
(-1.84) 
-0.05* 
(-1.89) 
-0.02* 
(-1.81) 
-0.04* 
(-1.90) 
-0.02* 
(-1.80) 
Market-to-Book -0.003 
(-0.34) 
0.005 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
-0.008 
(-0.74) 
-0.004 
(-0.41) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
Number of Business Segments 0.007 
(1.63) 
0.003 
(1.54) 
0.002 
(1.50) 
0.006 
(1.60) 
0.003 
(1.53) 
0002 
(1.51) 
Departing CEO Stock Ownership -1.02 
(-1.40) 
-0.99 
(-1.34) 
-1.05 
(-1.42) 
-1.03 
(-1.39) 
-1.04 
(-1.39) 
-0.92 
(-1.36) 
Managerial Entrenchment 
Component 
2.12*** 
(2.77) 
    2.03** 
(2.01) 
Monitoring Component 
(Institutional Ownership) 
 -1.31** 
(-1.99) 
   -1.29* 
(-1.90) 
Monitoring Component 
(Board Ownership) 
  -1.25* 
(-1.84) 
  -1.20* 
(-1.83) 
Post-Retirement 
Career Component 
   1.94** 
(2.07) 
 1.57* 
(1.89) 
Incoming CEO Component     -1.53** 
(-2.18) 
-1.34* 
(-1.87) 
R2 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08 
N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
 
The five principal components act according to expectations in table 7.6 as well.  
However, firm age ceases to be a significant determinant of managerial conformism, 
when the change stock performance at the end of the probationary period is used as the 
dependent variable. 
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Table 7.6 
Determinants of the Change in Stock Performance 
(Using the Principal Components Analysis Results) 
 
The dependent variable in the regression models is the change in the abnormal stock returns of the firm 
upon the conclusion of the probationary period when the new CEO takes on the combined CEO and 
Chairman of the Board title (i.e. ΔC). Log size is the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm, and 
market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value.  Firm age is the number of 
years since the establishment of the company until the start of the probationary period.  Managerial 
entrenchment, monitoring, post-retirement career and incoming CEO components are the five components 
with eigenvalues greater than one in the principal components analysis.  The 20 firms with incomplete 
succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.36 
(1.68) 
0.71 
(1.66) 
0.49* 
(1.72) 
0.34 
(1.67) 
0.67* 
(1.89) 
0.45 
(1.64) 
Log Size -0.89* 
(-1.94) 
-0.65* 
(-1.76) 
-0.62* 
(-1.71) 
-0.73* 
(-1.89) 
-0.60* 
(-1.71) 
-0.75* 
(-1.82) 
Firm Age -0.06 
(-1.63) 
-0.03 
(-1.44) 
-0.03 
(-1.44) 
-0.05 
(-1.62) 
-0.03 
(-1.49) 
-0.05 
(-1.62) 
Market-to-Book -0.008 
(-0.74) 
0.005 
(0.42) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
0.006 
(0.59) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
Number of Business Segments 0.0004 
(1.54) 
0.0004 
(1.56) 
0.0003 
(1.53) 
0.0006 
(1.59) 
0.0003 
(1.52) 
0.0006 
(1.60) 
Departing CEO Stock Ownership -0.0035 
(-1.23) 
-0.0024 
(-1.17) 
-0.0066 
(-1.35) 
-0.0012 
(-1.15) 
-0.0051 
(-1.26) 
-0.0040 
(-1.24) 
Managerial Entrenchment 
Component 
0.054** 
(2.16) 
    0.041* 
(1.79) 
Monitoring Component 
(Institutional Ownership) 
 -0.044** 
(-1.98) 
   -0.040** 
(-2.00) 
Monitoring Component 
(Board Ownership) 
  -0.031* 
(-1.77) 
  -0.023* 
(-1.71) 
Post-Retirement 
Career Component 
   0.072 
(1.58) 
 0.055 
(1.52) 
Incoming CEO Component     -0.010* 
(-1.83) 
0.009* 
(-1.80) 
R2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 
N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
 
The managerial entrenchment component has a significantly positive effect on the 
level of managerial conformism.  On the other hand, monitoring components have 
significantly negative effects.  If the incentives of the incoming CEO are aligned with 
those of the shareholders, managerial conformism is significantly lower.  The only 
interesting difference in stock performance results is that post-retirement opportunities 
have no significant effect on the level of managerial conformism, measured by the 
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change in stock performance at the end of the probationary period.  Again, similar to the 
findings presented in the previous tables, the incentives of the incoming CEO have 
significant effects on the level of managerial conformism, while the departing CEO’s 
stock ownership remains insignificant. 
Probably the most direct measure of the level of managerial conformism is the 
increase in the number of policy decision taken by the firm after the new CEO gets the 
combined title.  Since most of the reputation of a manger lies on the decisions he 
implements, the departing CEO in the firm would have incentives to ensure the 
continuation of his policies, while the new CEO would have incentives to keep the status 
quo in order to curry favor.  However, when the new CEO completes the probationary 
period and obtains the combined title, most of these incentives would disappear, leaving 
the new CEO free to implement his own policies.  As stated in H5 in chapter 3, if 
managerial conformism exists in the firm, then the number of major policy decisions 
undertaken is expected to increase significantly after the completion of the probationary 
period.  The higher this increase, the more serious managerial conformism problems are 
in the company.  Table 7.7 presents the results of regression analyses where the increase 
in the number of policy decision after the completion of the probationary period is used 
as the dependent variable.   
Results indicate that, consistent with expectations and previous results, larger and 
older firms have lower degrees of managerial conformism.  The increase in the number of 
major policy decisions is significantly lower for larger and older firms in all regression 
specifications.  The share ownership of the departing CEO again has no significant 
effects of the level of managerial conformism. 
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Table 7.7 
Determinants of the Change in Number of Policy Decisions 
(Using the Principal Components Analysis Results) 
 
The dependent variable in the regression models is the change in the number of policy decisions of the firm 
upon the conclusion of the probationary period when the new CEO takes on the combined CEO and 
Chairman of the Board title (i.e. ΔC). Log size is the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm, and 
market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value.  Firm age is the number of 
years since the establishment of the company until the start of the probationary period.  Managerial 
entrenchment, monitoring, post-retirement career and incoming CEO components are the five components 
with eigenvalues greater than one in the principal components analysis.  The 20 firms with incomplete 
succession processes have been excluded from the regressions.  All errors are White-corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.14 
(0.93) 
1.17 
(0.95) 
1.35 
(1.12) 
1.26 
(1.07) 
1.16 
(0.95) 
1.08 
(0.79) 
Log Size -0.71* 
(-1.90) 
-0.84** 
(-2.01) 
-0.70* 
(-1.90) 
-0.72* 
(-1.94) 
-0.82** 
(-1.99) 
-0.59* 
(-1.77) 
Firm Age -1.05* 
(-1.90) 
-1.04* 
(-1.90) 
-1.02* 
(-1.75) 
-1.03* 
(-1.86) 
-1.04* 
(-1.90) 
-1.03* 
(-1.88) 
Market-to-Book 0.02 
(1.42) 
0.03 
(1.48) 
0.04 
(1.50) 
0.05 
(1.54) 
0.03 
(1.52) 
0.05 
(1.56) 
Number of Business Segments 1.07 
(1.53) 
1.03 
(1.44) 
1.02 
(1.40) 
1.06 
(1.50) 
1.03 
(1.43) 
1.02 
(1.41) 
Departing CEO Stock Ownership -1.002 
(-0.98) 
-1.01 
(-0.99) 
-1.007 
(-0.94) 
-1.005 
(-0.94) 
-1.00 
(-0.92) 
-1.009 
(-0.98) 
Managerial Entrenchment 
Component 
1.28*** 
(3.24) 
    1.20*** 
(3.08) 
Monitoring Component 
(Institutional Ownership) 
 -2.03*** 
(-5.22) 
   -1.76*** 
(-3.61) 
Monitoring Component 
(Board Ownership) 
  -1.07* 
(-1.86) 
  -0.99* 
(-1.72) 
Post-Retirement 
Career Component 
   0.97* 
(1.70) 
 0.92* 
(1.69) 
Incoming CEO Component     -2.41** 
(-2.03) 
-2.18* 
(-1.89) 
R2 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.27 
N 183 183 183 183 183 183 
 
Consistent with the findings in previous tables managerial entrenchment and the 
potential for future employment for the departing CEO exacerbate the level of managerial 
conformism, while outside and board monitoring alleviate it. 
In all seven tables in the chapter the effect of departing CEO stock ownership is 
insignificant, while the stock ownership of the incoming CEO in the first two tables with 
all the proxies and the incoming CEO component in the later tables, reduce managerial 
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conformism.  In other words, aligning the incoming CEOs incentives with those of the 
shareholders is a more effective control mechanism than aligning the incentives of the 
departing CEO. This may suggest that more of the managerial conformism comes from 
the incoming CEO’s need to curry favor with the departing CEO and the board then the 
departing CEO enforcing his methods.  It may also mean that by the time the departing 
CEO retires, his stock ownership provides less incentives than future possibilities do. 
The results presented in all seven tables are consistent.  Older and larger firms, 
firms and firms with stronger outside or board controls on management experience lower 
degrees of managerial conformism.  However, the level of diversification in the firm and 
the growth potential do not seem to have significant effects on the level of managerial 
conformism.  Entrenchment of the departing CEO, on the other hand, exacerbates the 
managerial conformism problem in probationary succession processes.  Increasing the 
stock ownership of the incoming CEO seems to be a better solution to the managerial 
conformism problem than increasing the stock ownership of the departing CEO, since the 
latter has no significant effects on any of the measures used for the level of managerial 
conformism.  Effective board and institutional owner monitoring seem to help alleviate 
managerial conformism problems significantly. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
I analyze the prevalent CEO succession process in US firms, termed ‘passing the 
baton’ in which the incumbent CEO/chairman of the board relinquishes the CEO title to 
his heir apparent but remains as chairman of the board for a probationary period to better 
monitor the new CEO and pass down any relevant information.  At the end of this 
probationary period, the new CEO is awarded the combined title of CEO and chairman of 
the board if he is successful, or is terminated otherwise.   
While the benefits of this succession system have been analyzed thoroughly in 
finance literature, the conflicts of interest between the former and the new CEOs inherent 
in this process due to the incentives of the incumbent CEO to ensure the continuation of 
his policies and visions for the firm as well as protecting his own performance from 
depreciating in value, have received little attention.  The retiring CEO has promotional 
incentives of serving on other firms’ boards based on his past performance, increasing his 
incentives to engage in succession-securing behavior.  
The results indicate the existence of agency costs in the succession process due to 
this managerial conformism.  Managerial entrenchment seems to exacerbate these 
problems, while the monitoring effectiveness of the Board of Directors and external 
monitoring mechanisms such as external Board members and institutional blockholders 
reduce these agency costs and the probability of managerial conformism. 
This dissertation revisits the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) question of “who 
monitors the monitor?’ and presents yet another source of conflicts within top 
management of the modern firm.  Furthermore, these findings provide pivotal 
information on the contemporary debate of the separation of the CEO and chairman of 
 - 113 - 
the board titles by showing that existing academic evidence is not conclusive.  
Additionally, with contemporary corporate events that have called to attention the 
effectiveness of both external and internal control mechanisms of firms, my results bear 
significant value.   
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